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CHAPTER I 
HJ~RODUCTION 
~is thesis is an exposition of tha ·effeot of the anti-
trust l a. s and their interpretation by the courts upon the 
business :practice of ranting quantity discounts. These ·dis-
counta are uaod by business as an incentive for retailers and 
h.oleaa.lers to c onfine their puroha.ses to l ar ge quant ities at 
a single time; but. t he use . of the quantity discount had been 
abused . A state of distinctive partiality in f avor of t he sa 
oonsum~r prevailed , often without regard to the sa.vin s due to 
qusntity production or distribution. ~op lim! ta occasionally 
were so hi h that only a few customers could ever hope to reach 
tho .1 In hundreds of oases ., the amount of the quantity dis-
count depended solely on the bargainino- pOYrer of the ind.i vidual 
company seeking t he price reduction ... t he.re was neither uni-
formity nor reason in discount schedules. 
This 'I;"Hls nat ural in that all discounts were determined as 
i ndividual matters subject to the bar gaining of the buyer snd 
tho seller. The Robinson•Patma.n Aot is an approach to solving 
t he basio problem of selling below oost, 2 Ma.se buying aocent-
uated t he evil inherent· in auoh selling and made it visible. 
In 1914, Congress enacted what ha.s since been known as the 
Clayton Act. The purpose of t his aot was to prevent unfair 
l . 
Ben~amin erne• Businea,s And The Robinson-Pa tJD&n ~ (N.Y.; Oxford Universi ty Freas,-r938i; p , iae. 
2tb1d.,p. 262. 
2 
methods of competition which include: pr ice discrimination. 
tyin of contr acts to eliminate dealings ·'th ooopotitora. 
and the acquisition of capital stook i n competi a omp ie~ . 
~e aro particula rly c oncerned ~ith price d i scrimina tion hereby 
e. seller disposes of his good s to one purchaser a t one price 
and to another purchaser at another price. under th e a e con-
di tiona and circum.sto.nces . As v'J1.ll be shown in Chapter II of 
t his thes i s , t h e n::Pri ca Discr imination to mee t compet i tion'' 
phrase proved fatal to the Clayton Act. 
~ r ublio opinion demanded th t this l aw be rectif ied . The 
~ l!, edera.J. Tr ade Commission was requested to make a study of the 
chain ~tore problem and t h use of quantity discounts . In its 
.Final Report on The Chain Store Investigation i n 1934 • t he 
Commission pointed out t hat chain stores ere uain_,. quantity 
discounts as a means of d1scr.irn1nat1on and recommended t hat 
an amendment be added to the Clayt on Aot. This • in 1936 , resulted 
in t he pass e. e of t he Robins on- Patma.n Aot. 
It may be asked• "What does this Act provide in order to 
prevent quantity discounts?" ~'o quote Senator Logan . \•ho >t as 
in char e of the Act in t he Sena te; "There ia nothin in the 
bill to pre'Vent quantity discounts. They are allo.,red; t hey 
have to be :U.lo'< ed ; t hey cannot be prohibited. It is ell roo ... 
ognized that if o.ne merchant buys a hundred thousand :pairs of 
shoes he should receive a. mora _,onerous discount than t he 
merchant ho only buys a thousand pairs. I mean by that t hat 
t he disor1m1nat1on or differential or price must be based ·upon 
t he cost of har1dling the transaction. the cost of diatri bution, 
the cost of manufac t ure, the cost of overhe ad , t he cost of 
transportation and yes i even the ooat of brokerage . } 11 t hose 
t h ings may be t aken into co nsidera tion, and in the quantity 
di scounts necessarily a man who buys a l a rge quantity would 
3 
et a l ar ger discount, l obody pro poses to interfere wi t h t hat: 
nobody objects to it; it is one of t he l a a of business; t hat 
must be so. But there may come such e. condition after a while 
tha t tha t purchaser becomes so enormously l ar ge, his purchas-
ing power is so tremendous. the quantity he buys may bec ome 
a o very great that the discount v.hioh ha receives d ll onable 
him to dri ve all others out of busi.ne sa • 
That ou ht not to be allov.·ed; that brings monopol y ; for 
if a man ha.a suoh purchasi ng power t hen he cen purchase ten 
million dolla rs worth of goods or a hundred million dollars• 
\'ltorth of goods, he oan force his own terms on the manufacturer 
and the seller and can orush out of exis tence all the inde-
pendents, all the smaller organiza tions; yes , and all the bi g 
organize tions. n3 
Chapter II of t his thesis presents t he economic back.-
gr ound of the Robinson-Pa t mnn Act and the reasons f or i to 
passage . Chapter III expla ins t he admi nis tra tion of t he Rob· 
inson- Patman Aot as conducted by the Federal ~:rade Commission. 
In Chapter IV is discussed what is meant by quantity discounts 
in its various forms . Concrete $Xamples of t hese quantity dis -
counts will be cited by le ading court oases in Chapter v. 
3 Congressional Record, April 26 , 1936 , p . 6282. 
Speoi:fioa.lly those of t ,he aorton Salt Company and he Gr a t 
Atlantio .And ?e.oi f io T.ea CompOJlf Cases. Th~ final chapter is 
a. compilation of the author's summary and oonolusions . 
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.6 
REA SO 
EOOI10I.aC BACKGROUUD ... 
Th Robinson-l?atman Act is a Feder 
on June 19, 19~6 . havi n for its purpose the prevention of 
discrimination in price am other discriminating pr ctioes 
injuriously affecting free oompe t1 t 1v enterprise.1 It is 
designed to afford protection against those practices to 
individual competitors at all levels of oom:petition; to ;pre-
serve competition generally and protect small bt'!s i nessmen 
in particular. 
In order ·to understand the reasons wny, in 1936. Section 
2 of t he Clayton Act was found insuffia ient to prevent dis ... 
crimi tion in price bet een purchasers~- it is necessary to 
bear in mind tbe current trends in busi;nasa gro~ th and t he 
differing t yws of injurious prio·e discriminations preval ent 
in 1914 and in 1936. 
In dr afting Section 2 of the orig i nal Clayton Act, Cong-
ress as ch iefly aonoerne.d l7ith local or territoria l price 
cut t ing. Large producers and manufacturers, having the benefit 
of i de distribution, were o.ble to lO\'ler t heir prices in 
communities \h ra ·they had c ompe tition. ovbile m..'lintaining 
high prices el sewhere. tiueh local price cutti nB we.a int ended 
not for t he l egitimate purpose of meeting compe tition, but 
for t h e purpose of putting a looal competitor out of business. 
1cyrus Austin, Price Discrimination And Rela ted bloma 
Under The Robinaon•Fa tman ot (Ameri can Law Institute, l950) ,p. 1 • 
.,;;:;;;;;;.;;; . -. - -
e report of the Judici a r y Committee of the House of 
Repreaontati vas stated: 
Section 2 of the bill ia expressly deei ned ~i th 
t he view of correcting and forbidding a common 
6 
and idespread unfair trade pr actice ~hereby 
certain grea t corporations and also certa in smaller 
concerns which seek to secure a monopoly in trade 
and commerce by aping the methods of t he great 
corpora tions , have heJ>etofore endeavored to des-
troy oom:pe titon end render unprofitable the busi-
ness of competitors by selling their goods, wares, 
and merchandise at a less price in the particular 
communities where their rivals are engi ed i n bus-
iness than at other pl aces throughout. 
The competition principally affected by this type of discrim-
ination is with the discriminating seller, not oompeti~~ 
<:r· 
3 between the seller's customers. 
In the 1920's and early l930'e the gl!'owth of the chain 
stores with masa bU3ing power in exoess of that of th e l arges t 
wholesalers in many industries brought about increasing demands 
for corrective legislation to protect the independents from 
the use of suoh buying power to ooe.roe price diaoriminationa. 
In the year 1900, there were only about seven hundred 
chains, including many two a.nd three store organizations rep-
resenting a t otal of only four th.ousa.nd five hundred outlets. 4 
It as only in this century that the fUl profit possibilities 
of this type of argan1zat1on lVBS realized so that it became 
possible to finance. them thru the sale of securities to the pub-
2H.R. Report l~o . 627• .63rd Congress-. second aossion (1.914 ). 
3 Austin, o;p.o1t., p. 6. 
~ederal Tr ade Co~aeion, Final Retort on The Chain Store 
Investigation• 74th Con ress. first ee'ss on, senate Document No. 4. 
1936. P• fi 
110. Since 1·900, their gr owth has been r api d . In 1910, there were 
three thousand chains opera ting thirteen thousand five hundred 
stores• and in 1920, nine thousand four hundred chains operating 
forty-nine thoueand ,two hundred stores. 
5 , 
~here as an 1noreae1ng effort to secure the intervention 
.of the government to p:revent thei:r growth and their ability to 
undersell their competitors. The first directed attempt at t he 
chain store as an effort to penalize. this type of mercha.ndisin 
6 by t he i mpos ition of di scriminatory taxes. This measure proved 
inadeqttate to restrain the growth of the chain stores . Between 
1929 and 1933;. . the pu.blic beoe.me increasingly price conscious 
as purchasing power deareasEH.i• ConaequEtntly , many eonsumers who 
had previousl y patronized independent retailers, despite the s ome 
Vlh at hi gher prices t hey char ged •. were forced to turn to chain 
stores. Furthermore. a s business fell off• price oompetiton among 
manufacturers became 1nore~aingly severe. Even those producers 
vrho had previously sought to prot.eot their distributors by main-
taining a uniformity of terms and discounts and by confining the 
flow of their goods to orthodox channels, often were forced to 
aaoept business on any available terms • 
. 6 
·Federal Tr ade Oomm1es1on, op. cit., p ~ 10. 
1zorn, op. oit., P•lX. 
ederal ~'rade Commission Inves t! ti 
... ga -on 
Co) Upon the b sis ot those 00 pl ft.t t . Q,l.n a, Co reas 
r&quested the Federal Trade Commission in 1928 to make 
a comprehensive study of the chain store problem. ~e 
purpose ot the chsin tore inquiry was to see "h~w far 
t he rapid grO\"lth in the ohain e tore syate·m of distribu .. 
tion was based upon aotua..l savi ngs in oost of management 
and operation and how far quantity prices were available 
only to ohein store diatti buto ra or any ole.a.s ot them and 
whether or not suoh quantity prioea oo rJs titutes a violation 
of either the ederal Trade Commission Aot, the Clayton Aot,. 
or &ll.Y other statute. and \lhat le gislation, if any, ehoud 
be en&o ted i th reference to suoh quantity pr ieee. 117 
The Cor.IIIlission was to report upon th e advanta ~a and 
d1eadvanta es of chain store distribution in comparison 
with those ot other types of dis t ribution as aho n by prices, 
.coste. profi ta. and JnSrgins; quality of goods, and serv1oes 
rendered by chain stores and other distributora or resulting 
from inte ration, mana. erial effioianoy • lO\"l overhead,. or 
other similar cs.ea. Of considerable 1 ~ortanoe is t he degree 
to Which chain store or anizations roly upon msnufacturers 
and other producers :for their sl.ippl1ea &nd · the extent to 
'Federal Tre.de Commission, on,.cti t,, P•l• 
8 
hioh they purchase them throu h Whol e sal.ers or other mid-
dlemen, The significance of this que tion lies in th fact 
that there are distinct differ no e smong ohains in v r1ous 
lines o:f business , as ell as within the sa e line, in the 
extent to \vhioh they undc;trta.ke to buy . ode direct from the 
manufacturers and to pe~form t he wholesnlin o rations for 
themselves. 'ihen they purohasa their oods f ro olosalers 
and other types of middlemen. they must esumabl y pay ome-
thin in eddition to the manu.faoturer •s aellin price for 
t he services rendered. The proportion of direc t buyin done 
9 
by the sftveral kinds of chains• therefore. has direot f:tects 
upon the oosts of chai n store distribution. a.s oo pared i th 
other types of di stribution, For a · p1e , those kinds of 
business in whioh the chains purchase l arger proportions of 
mercha.!ldiae direct from manufe.oturere show larger rose profits 
on sales than those linea in which th& chains buy lese directly', 
.(b) In the oou.r e of tl e stuey -,hich :.ra.a oomuotod o, er 
a period of six and half years and ooetit:J.g rnore t .an a 
illion doll a3;"a . th Commission sooured U<Ll ad.d.i tiona.l data 
on the use of quantity discount . and special allo\~1cas as 
8 a device for disori inat1on, e report olyzee 1 deta11 
the various methods used by soma of the larea chain organ .... 
ization e to foroe oonoessions of various kinds from mnu-
taoturere. It summarizes the pr erentla.l treatment granted 
8Vernon . und , Govermrant !nS l3usiness {U.Y.: Harper Broa., 
1950), P• 339 .. 
to chain stores in the follO\ ing ay : 
u~e preferenoos _ anted chains by I"Janu.t\ .. c t rers f 11 
into the f ollo ing , .eneral olassifiaations: volume a.llo1; -
anoes , promotional eJ.lov:ano~s . allOY a.naea in lieu of brok-
ers. e, freight allo"fi.a.nces , and. guarra.nt~es agains :r-•rice 
declin ,n 
Volume a l l owance · have been classified as s Stra i gh t 
voluma allowa.noea , no quotas or ine:r asos speci ·ied: vo111100 
allowances ;ith a quota specified: progressive di counts 
increo.ailVJ with volum~u discount s f or 1ncres.ee in volume 
over som prior periods . and ull other vol ume allo ·.ancee: 
not Opteifi d•" 
}irotnotional allowances ar ola.sai:fi cd as "IJ e s pa:per v.d• 
vertiaingt allowances , windo 'I diopl~;~oy allovaw s , al lo 1ances 
for featuring d deals, and other a.vertisin an pro otional 
allo ancas.1 a.n<l have for this purpo e tne mutue.l benefit of 
the i ntoree e parties . · ~ne:re preforanoes Qre gr an ted in the 
form of promotional s llowano o ithout the rendi t io o services 
in return. they ara , in eff ot, priae ooncession h vin0 no 
direot relation to quali ty of oods , quant ity purohase , or 
. 9 
oost of selling. 
~e r :port also states that s pacial discounts an all o. -
anoes are gr anted to ohaina ovor and ab ove those allo~ ed to 
9 
·ederal r ade Commission, op,a,i,t 1 , P• 6o. 
11 
11 Sp cia.l iSCOUUtS end ullO J®CeS ' 1 l:'e defi ne by ;"" G 
Oo -· as i on :for t 1e purpose of t 1is i nq i ry o. s all 10;;:, forms 
of ollm·T!mces , made t o d '"'tributors , not appearin on the face 
of the invoice . « ~he chains appar ntl y cmefi t t o a much c rev:. ter 
oxt nt t rom these s peci al discounts n llo .ranees . :.~.: e Com-
mi ssion ' s f i s ures indicate t hat mor e mc:. ufaoturers rna .e allo ,_ 
ances to c i ns th&n mcke such ~11o ~auces to mol es ers nd 
tho proportion of chain account s carry ing allo iancos ·-;as far 
ree ter than tho :prO}; ortion of l. Olesa.le account s • 
• l so in - 1 those lines of business , the rcantage rati os 
of ""llo,.ances \>'ere very l!lUch higher on sales t o chF.~.ire t ~ i n 
those to vm olesalers . In 1930 , for e:ra.mpl e • the re,tes of the 
sr:eciel aJ.lot.:n.moes on total sal s of all raportin0 manu:f....,cturers 
to tobacco ch~ inc \'JUS 3 . 57 per cent as corn red dth . 71 per 
cent to ;;,nol e sc:.o.lers , to grocery chc.i:ns 2 , 02 r cent , as com• 
:pared ith , 91 per cent to ; ,holese.lers., an to rug ch ina . 
5.19 per cent oomps.red to 1.11 pax· cant • In r e l t ion to n. es 
of only those manufac t urers whio made nllo ;ances , t e ra. e s 
lO 
-.ere of cou ae highar . " 
The Commission cone luded "that tne e.bili ty o:f the chain 
store t o obtain oods Qt l o er cost t:P..an st1a.ll stores i s an 
outs t a.nd i ~ fea ture of t he ro ' th and develo ent of chain 
1 
_/ 
, t re merchund i sing. These lov"er cos.ts have frequentl y found 
e prassion in the · orm of specia l d iscount s , co coosio · , or 
colla tora l pti .:.log s v;hich "" r e not o.vailo.bl e to m 1 pu:rch -
oers . i'he <JVi .enc e pointed t the feet tha tho large c in 
stores .t<;,re using thoir stro g ba.r g inii e po er t o force i m ... 
:portant suppliers to erent them l 01"1er prices t _a.n were g an ted 
12 
to inc.topondent distributors , under the guise of qu nt ·· t y d.iscounts. 
Upon t he ba.:.is of its J.'in. int)s , the Co:rmnissi n conclt ed t t t he 
c ha i n s tores were s ecuring l owe;r prices fro m thei r s pl.Jliere in 
rela tion to those puid by in epon dents a that s uch prices could 
not b just ified b:l t 1e lo'f'lor cost involve 1 eellin .. larger 
qu.an ities to the chains, 
The report of tho co · saion reviews t '" e e. t e t to h!ch 
ch""'ins may be sa id a~l bein~ erJt;a~e in _nt rst to co eroe. lt 
pointu out tha t un er cert~in Supreme Court dooi siono • "tho chai n 
store · in transport n their o ~n r.'I'OOds D-cro .... l3 rJta e lines t o 
t hai:r various toren o,.. i n pu.:rcl a.;;>inu for 1;3 .ti_pmont by the eller 
to the oln in · toros n oth r .;:.tF.J.tes , or in t · i n delivery in one 
s t a o an thomselves ... hi ping to ~tor<3s and 's r h ouses i n other 
ststas , are onso.ein in inter st te oo mnJOroe . " 11 
In oonci erino oha in otoro s yatoms as pos i " l o o poliea 
under the anti- truGt l a.rls ,. t ho repor t o ate ... , "~ o tiJ-1on 
which they f urnio · to a·c .oth r . suppl e onted by tlat of inde-
pend.ellt otores . v1oul.d seem to negative monopoly by any indiv-
idual chuin. " A study ot the a:xtent to ·.vhieh ahuin· store compani es 
11Federa.l Tr ade Commissi on • . op.cit., P• 19, 
have invad(:Jd the eneral fiel d of re·tail distribution of 
commodities doos uot indiente a monopoliza tion of t h t 
field tak n a a whole.l2 
Prior o t he decision, hunde own by t e court in 
13 
t he case of George Van Camp and Sons v • American Can o. • 
during a period when chain s tores were enjoyin a n e tens1 ve 
growth based largely upon speci al price oonoossions fr om rnan-
ufaoturera ,. the Commission ~as prevented y oou:rt deci ion 
frDm appl ying Saotion 2 of th Clayt on Ac t to eliora te the 
re ult ant competitive situation bet1:e n tho chnine , th co-
oparstives, and the independents .• 
Such deoi aions naturally d1 aoura. ed th Cornmisai .on 
with r oopeot to the institution of further rooaed1 s . Even 
\11th favorable interpre tation and vigorous onforoo ent of 
Section 2 serious eoo mio and eooia.l robl or.1s row out of 
price oono ssion ade to lerge en in or · izntions th 
resou~oas vastly in .xces s of most i ndi vidual i n epondont s . 
Such ooneessi ons may be r El garded as la f ll beo us be rin.~ a. 
\ 
reasonable relationshi p t o tha fer l arger quantity of the 
ohs.i.n.s puro1ases . t he h r tho resultin~ oo mpet i t tv . adv nta. e 
shoul d be curbed by new l gi al a.ti on may ultimate~y · rove to 
be an 1mport unt social and economic questi on.13 
The oommiasion re Jected th$ poaoibility of Federal Tax 
1 2 ederal Trade Commission. op.gi t, • P•l9·. 
13Ibi d~t , PP• 90· 91. 
l :.;iolr.l :i n 011 cha in stor·es on the l' round that v ery serious 
scc:l r l n il oconomi c :p.obl .. ms .H)r i nv l ve .· n nn ef~"" l"' t o 
(c) Ren e •rli1,'3 v~rious ·sur os ti onn fo me ting t 1e ..: ro -
l am, t h o Co1rLtniscl on rec ornmn ea an amendmcn of Sec tion , o:f 
t ho Cl nyton c to pr ovide t h ... t r r ice i:ffer anc o ... p i tta 
If on account of' di ffere ces in quant i tj oh 11 mnl. .. A onl y , e 
( llcra"" nce f or di f fe r en.co i n co s ts . 'l: 
t h o .1.1. ioul tios an i.'4"1<Wrt ntios of o 1forci n0 Sec t i on 2 o 
t ile Cla~ t on Ac t under t he variouu '>ro sos limi ti l t e c 
of t he pr hi oi t i on. It reo o, n-.:nd.ed t lt: t t ere bA ~1llbati t u te 
a broad prohi bition o unfair an un jus t di scrim .nation. 
Anti·T~ust Legislation • 
I The Sherman Act and ita limita tions: 
(a) The ris e of modern American anti-trust attitude dates 
:from the period following the Civi~ \ ar wh en the industria l 
nd territorial expansion of the United States as accompanied 
14 y out throa t oompeti tion. 
:,:r. 
It as after the 1 vil VI r that riva.te monopoly appeared 
,. 
as a menace to 'Ublio welfare. :E ortunee 'ere tmde as indus-
trial empires roo e • . often by means that were not merely un-· 
ethioal. bt t a.otu. lly mlnwful. 
14 
The uso of l a r go · oa.l e ant :r-prj.seo \as · coo Janied i n 
tho 1870 ' s an 1880 ' s y tho emerae .n.c · o:f pnrticul o· ·ly ... ,o er e 
15 
con ti tion. In ~7 .rt t · i s ¥.as vi denc of the fac t t t new • 
1ar~e- sc ..tle pl n. .. ts ware ( riVi ng :)malle:r an l ess efficient 
rivals f rom u.slnes s . Ir1 ny in u :-Jtri a o ,. gemL al e .. ::/l.n ..,. :i. on of 
15 
f'a c1.1 t ies led to a. tempor a r y ourrltt ... , of c -. city a.ncl t h , ei ore 
t o cor et:itive :price cu.ttlne among l arge :r ival firm"' . -ri c e 
c or.pet tion t·o.:l pot .nti lly rui nous to ·11 . 
_s thi s t endency evelore , the co eti ng f:t rmo i n mr.ny 
industries sought to a void the rava e s of unre s t toted r i ce 
ri ~ lry by formin~ co bi Mtions · r me r gers . ~ 10 ueu·l 
combined oGvernl i rms in an in<u~ try into a sin. l e corporution 
after hich it c l oae ovn ine i oient pl ants , exprnded others , 
a.nd Someti Me ... effect. v .. !'iOUS types Of ve r tic · . i nt e; r ntion. 
T 1a motive fo r c on1bina.t1on was t H) desiro to .li. i n e o con-
trol co j..:'e t t i on . .. u th l css t a c t i cs v;Are e!~ploya to dri.e re ... 
rn.ainin com et i ,orn ont of n s in'3ss or to h..;.ras<!< t o t o s 11 
out to th oon Jina t i on , - So -\ i da ·fi re r.:.d a d corrupt ~-, .J c ·~.~ 1 
prac t ices of thaso com ... n~tions t a the r. optio 1 o · a l an 
to control busi nens became vital politica l i ssue iL ti1o 1 BO!s• 
Finally i n 1890 , · the She .~an Act v s a op t o d clc.. :d < .. , 
''1 ery cont r act , c onui ootion , i n t he or m o tr st or oth rrlise, 
15 
rold i 'illia s on , ilflo Gro 1th Of :o.:h e merioan ~ono!Pl { • .Y .: Pr0nt ice Hall,. 1945-r;-p. ' 'lOa . --
16 
or conc·piracy in ro '-, tr -int of trad ·or co eroe ong th 
16 
several stat ·"' o · v. i th fo re i gn ::..tn.iorlz i s ill a~·· 1 . " ~e 
act -. :;o m"d i t ille ~ for ··' o·opoli ze , or ~~t-
-vlTI'''Yt, to onopoli zc n3 part of the t e. e Ol' cot .. ere • · he 
st ... t :te ·"'urth r rov1~.ed t • t y rson viola t-'r_. ·. 1 l a 
; _ s c; 1 ty ..-.£ ~ c1•i m- , an th<.t "' :tn · met! 
by t courtr t o sto p -i C i .lle ..... al ot ~ , ru1 th 
' 
~ ~r 0 
i n jUl."O by hi13 con uct could sue or tr:.blo 'i"hi~ 
change the co 'IOn l t..W tm er -:;;h;i. c _ .. n o.er es t r uin · 
of tra 'r7ttrS un- enfor(:oc. lo y the pa tiec• to n .. ... 
1t under 1ih i ch D.S lon . o t he pn.:rtios o ntL.uad -+ o co- op_.:t·a.t e, 
nai thor t .1o ~mrernmont nor any :per. on injured h· an l e 1 
:;3 i n ou 
COm;' titi Ve v]StOf; tlS Otl' 6 0 0 0.1iC 0 der b IDIJ.int .inin~ tH3 
n.' turnl flm;.r of trad ... · n f reedom of cot .. r.., ti tion i n :i.nteratu.t e 
c oC~..:nerc • 
(b ) Tho ahormnn Le t illurr l"ates both the 1fl"icul t ies of 
r:overnmont ra ulation of bus iness an· the de euts :o. t :t.e druf t-
illG of st-tuto for tha pur ose . The st . tu a i va.;.;.ue te. s 
conde nne com in.'l ~ ions i n roztr :dnt of 1·1tar"' t · te oor oro 3.!ld 
a.ot1v1 ... 1 ,.. ·,:,· ich rnonopolizo t' .:lot c mnaz·c • Y' i thout u.::.li-ioation. 
t hese or .. on onne in eve rv instance 1i thout re· a.rd o vl e ther 
16 
United ~tatea Codo. 1946 • 
17 
or o-t .ll· ·o, e:t 0reated by the combi n&tion or monopoly wa s 
in fac t ..... r oi ro fc- t ~ e .c urpo e or -:.1. h t e ""'Af!l t of d i ng 
ha:c r. . ··oreover . no reco - ~...iti.on ., ('! g v n. y o t ,_ ute t o t e 
poBzi bili t- hat ho pu lie mi iY1t n.v e "n i ntor e t i n con. 
r eo m ina.ti on . 
Th-v uilu.r e to recoe. ~i ze rn-: -· ov 1 si on.. fo 
err~t ions l e to Ju~: i ci al eo i s ".on"' t h a t 1 eff- ct · tt .e 
I t h s often been s~id t n.t the She !'!".an et h s een. 
f _lure boc , s i t has not rrcvent.. t1e or .' . s r r o11! th of 
econo o concentra. t i on and . ono1 ol y r: ic res n l e t 1 
t. 1·,... u . t d c • .( ,. ,j, l. 7 ~ , 111 , .... vc::. ,,e • -- . 1e f s..c or ~ f eb 1 s con.t 1 u ted t o 
t hi :o co:ndi t i on has . eon the weeJ . enfo e ~nt of' t e nti - trus t 
J_uw. I 1 t he :fi rst f i:f t ee. yer::,rs o· . . i ·s l story it r A-lMost 
U11USea. 1 0 I<"'r om 1891 thr o1l£ · .905 • u: 1n0 the mos t aeti v phase 
OI t he m rger mov e ents . only t Pent y-t o ea s P. s era rought under 
i t , . of '.Jhich only ic lt~en oonc:.rne in ustri 1 oonoentr tion. 19 
A sum -r y of cases institute under the h~m~.n ot e oh 
your .)ho• s vigorous n:for c eo"nt d•i d not ~et tmder ti 1 bout 
1 ~10 , 2° From 1906 to 1920 1 moGt of the mt.jor e a es wer e oon-
\ 
c erned v.'i t h h a a ttempt to di ~:Jsolve c :is inz 
17
vernon ·un • ·t on. cJ. ., .• 194. 
1 8
uaro l d dll1 s on, op . cit ., ;..- • 718 . 
l9lb1d~, PP• 718- 724 . 
20 
. I bi d. , p 720• 
r ,..)ers .. io 
seamed t o monopolize their resp octi ve 1nllnstrl as . ~e} in-
volved t he Standard Oil ComJ'tmY and the Oonsolido.ted"'~,Tobo.cco 
Company. l!'rom 1921 to 1932 1 a.n averaga of 1·1 c nos _ r y a.r 
. ' 1 
" were broUght undEU" the anti-trust l aws . These oases wore 
directed against restl·ainta of tr do ar i 1 out of agree-
ments among inde:pend.ent oompeti tors desi ned to limit comp-
etition. :h,rom 1933 t o 193'1, the operation of the Sherman Act 
was lar el y auapandod by the .J'f&tional Induatria.l eoovery 
18 
Lnder tb1a l atter aot 1 industries were requested to form private 
cartels to be a.pprovod and enforced by the government. 
I! ot until 1~40• \~en 'l'hurman Arnold vas appointed s head 
of t he anti-trust division, di d enforcement proce . din~a begin 
to flourish. 23 The a1m of the Arnol d program a·· to ~ncraase 
substantiall y the degree of competition and eorres pondi l y 
to r e uoe pr ioea. through eli 1na.t1on of ''private aeizw:e" of 
the cont rol of marke ts or private cont rol of competition. 
In thi s year of t he expand · d p;rogr atn, 1 hty- f 1 ve cases 
ere i nstituted UDder the anti-trust l a1J s . The truth is t hat 
t h e pol1ey of the Sharman Aot has har dl y been tried. 
I t i s generally agreed that the major reason for t he weak 
enforcement of the Sherman Act has been the f aot that over t he 
yea ra our publio autho.rities. e:xeoutives, judicial. and l e s ... 
l a tive, have not had the 1.11.11 or d.esiro to enforoe the le.·:.24 
21 \ illiams on, op,oit,. P• 722. 
"
2Ibid., P• 723. 
23 Ibid., p , 724 . 
24 
und , ,op , oi t ., P• 194 . 
At no t_m3 , moreover . h s the department of Justice bad 
Tb~ Fe ral Court . , li e v.se . hav oo tributed to the 
r - l a i ve i .taf:f~. ctiven ss f the . ct. Import~ nt actions on their 
par-t :~hioh hswe serve to e<:>. n it h ve ea:ru (1) th Sl)urious 
.istLction \ ic the v U r mo Court d. i n t a Kni -- t c e 
1695 'bot ween tflr.l, ct rln.,. ru:1o ec m reel ( 2) t he ddition of 
.J. 0 '"o-called r u e c r a F'on" to he Sher n_ Act in the \1 
6!1 an .: ·me ric 'm Ob.~-CCO c B of. 1911. 1 deoi slon 
! ~.t 
1 t'l.!."" ', (, {(~ :pooh mr. d .n ;l an, r .11olutioni zed. t h 1 • Its si ~ .:J..fiea oe 
t o co · t for t e fir t time read into 
Uj o 1 .n --:; u_"' ge of t h - Sh crrnon LtJ. t h , lifieation th t on y 
.. ose res rcl. Y.l t s o r a e :e i let: .1 lhich "unre . onab1 " 
o:r "unduly" 1 .. eotr .ne. !' cle ; ( 3) Tb.A "U.Ge of rule o:f rea on. 
i• 
.u t ho St ol c Z G {1920) to ., lSti:f' ~ .,_, 11'1er -·' l" hioh restrained 
the con.~,etition of scor · 0 forme l "' in de end nt pl n S l (4) 
the co si c.o .tJ. ion of 'mott es" n.m " buf'es 1r in lyin~ the 
,:;.J1ermn.n Act r a uher t .n th e ::?i stone o mono:nol~ e. e.n ao tual 
.vi 
'Oonomic conui t ion;; ( ) t gon.er ·1 :r.a. s 1 of the court to 
;.ro i bit mol'P"ers tl}"'ed on the acq i si tion of assets. Al l these 
instances ~-oint to t e ct t nt the Fe era1· Courts ,too.have 
not ha nn -ctivo lntcrost in -r, lyin~ the {.'herm, n Act. in lly 
Con~re?s i tself ovo1~ iihe :re rs has not been ;llin~ to en ot 
25 ... d 
.. J.un , 
19 
suppl ementar y l ·gi s lat ion t~ prevent the\ ittling away o~ 
the She rman Act by adverse court decisions. The raaoon why the 
executive judicial br~mchos of the eovernment ha v been 
unwilline to ~i ve wh ole-hearted support of the .. ot i tlle pre ... 
esu:re of or ganiz d S!Jiral interests and in the :.~educt! ve in-
fluence of euba t a:ntial camp i t;n contr1 u tors. ~e influence 
of preo:sure groups may e rpreas 1 t$elf in tho appointment of 
the J ttorney-General and in the nomination of ju gea for 
app int mant o t he federal courts. Until 1910 n majority of 
the a ppoint ees t o tho Supreme Court t1er e men m o he.d made dis-
tinguished records as corporation 1 \vyers . These men had lon 
been tre ined i n serving the interests o~ l argo oor ora tions 
20 2 
and they brought to the c ourt a backgroun.d nd habit of t hinking 
which made them unwill ing to d.o much more then frown upon the 
preda-t ory practices o:t monopoly. 
A second factor wh ich l ed to the relative ineffectiveness 
of the anti ... trust l aws has beon the 1 :vish e · endi tur ea by large 
cor porations in anti~trust suito in oomp rison with the amounts 
available t o the f ader 1 26 overnment. The division has a 
ceiling of ''10,000 :por yeD.r· upon the salaries . hioh it mus t 
pay. and th is li~itation ha s prevented it from retaining many 
able and experienced attorneys. for priva te oorpor tiona at nd 
ready t o pay several ti os that amount and more. 
li third faotor which has cont ribut ed to the eak enforce-
ment of the a:uti-trust l aws has beon the extensive emJ>loyment 
·o11din~~ rn 110p · ·• nt1.c 
w t n 
a orpo:r t ions t o 
27 )r sc t· .c"' • 
he 
U !11' v - 1 en 
ct t r t 1i l. 
21 
asn :;:t in 
.an en-
nt 
, 1 n·· ,_ :.; n.a e 1.&t .o t cconpl i,..lL. i t:J pu O:JG r.nc hnt , ... c1 -
( i t i lJ '1 1 "':r.'"' ro uire to t'CHJ.Ch nn 
r:~e ·J.o~9 o c ·:r · ct i tiol . 
r c .. . uot , n c ce. "t.,:t" 
cit . ~ ro .J l907 ,o ~ lt!: 
, , .. 
. - v 
un:ft. 
·1cor. pane 
"he u . · n -
1 t ,· '~f :rt , .: .. 111 ·.·i 1 , on. 1~o . o .... ycc.rs p1· · or c 10 4 , t 
of th,., ''l rman 1 et 711:.\S ";hEJ st l jcc t O.·. h~ f : 11...-n for e 
Con.,rcY's i on.-~1 ~o~i ,;t 0" ~ n of eba ' s · n Co ror:~s . 
thia .,. ·1 tor o · de t , ~;:. n~ a cont:r.ovo:r.sy cur..c · 1 · o 1 t'il. ~1rt e 
"'·o l 4 ' .., i o"' '· c· ... ~ • ..!..a... l..J _;J .&.J. •• • the Cln.y · O:i.1 ct o 1 91 <..: . 
.o~-10_ ol._ or th . s . - r e sicn of c om1 · i on i n a nn k t . .l 
191 ...! ; e:z.-porionce ho.d proved that 2v • re y na .a_, v sur for 
oo.fe t'J'unr di n 00 com , t 1 ti o~ · •'as ine:f:fect t"re but ~u.i t ll i n t ho under-
l y i n g po ic ~' i nvo1 oc! h... not be en di ·turbe d . 1 tho hth e .i ms 
of polin¥ wer& ;re .. a f f i l' ed . · th new le al a t ion a l t ered both the 
22 
scope and method o:f g overnment regulation. Direct regulat ion 
of business praot ices and policies was added to the negative 
regulation of business relati onship which had been instituted 
a quarter o.f a century earlier. An administrative process of 
detectio:r1 and correction of trade abuses as added to the 
traditional legialative·-~udicial process. 
The ]'ederal ~ra.de Comm1 as1 on . Ao t -
1'he general vimvs of Congress on the prohibition o:f un-
f a ir methods ot competition were embOdied in the Federa l Trade 
Commission Aot which Vf&S signed br Presi dent \1oodrow v:11son on 
Septeml)er 26• 1914. The principal :provision of this legislation 
was for the creation of the Federal ~Tade Commission of five 
members to be appointed by the President, with the advice and 
consent of t he Senate, and for terms of seven years. The heart 
of the Act is section five which etates ·"that unfair methode 
of oompeti tion in commerce are hereby declared unlawful. "" \ihen-
ever the commission shall have reason to believe thn't any such 
person. partnershi p, or corporation has been or is using any 
unfair me thods of competition in commerce, and if 1t shall appear 
to the oommiaa1on that a proceeding by it in respect thereof 
would be to the interest of the public, it shall issue and serve 
a C· ompl aint. tt 28 
The phr ase unfair method of compe ti tion was a general and 
all inclusive condemnation of unethical and uneconomic trade 
28 . ( . ') .J!. 38 St atute 717 1914 16 u. s.c. ~41-51 
pro.etices. It was ufficiontly broad to cover e. • 1 · 1 .. ang of 
unfair pr otloas . It al so looked to the fu ture since :it oould 
23 
be i nterpreted to embrace narn unfair me t hods ;hioh w. re li .ely 
to be developed 1n a cons t antly oh ngin economic world. ~he 
intention as apparentl y that it should inolud not only prac-
tices hioh ore deoeptiv an f r au ulent. but praotloea which 
tended to destr oy competition and establish monopoly. Unfair 
oomp ti tlon baeina t o oreop into busi ness 'IJ hen particular pr an-
t1oos or me thods are employed by some seller s to h per , restrict, 
or h i nder others and to dent them the opportunit a of surviving 
or expar~ ing on tho basts of their oductlve effic1enoy. 29 
11th the 1"1 ae of monopo11s t1o mergers. various forma of prtoe 
d1 s or1 minat1on oame t o be re arded as the principal f orme of 
unfair competition. Today i n larg~measure, the probl em of un-
f a ir oompeti tion oontinu.ea to center on the prac·tioe of varianc e 
pricing. Congress al so felt that an administrati ve agency ith 
powers of i nvesti gation .nd powers to i ssue oeaee and deei 't 
orders could devise a speedy me thod f ox- the da teotion d prompt 
eliminati on of unfair bus iness praotioes • .Adverse and. oonfl1o t 1ng 
oourt deci s ions,. cumbers ome procedures , and other difficulties 
ha.ve prevented the Commi ssion from a.ocomplishing a.ll the objectives 
ori i nally intended. 
The Ola_zto:n Aot .. 
(a ) Altho h the pra.ot ioe of u.nfair competition oould havo 
been attacked under Sec t ion f ive of the Federal Tr ade Commission 
Act. Con reas singled it out for s pecific prohibition in the 
Clayton Act signed by .Prasi en.t \'!!leon on October 16, 1914. · 
The main pur ose o~ the Clayton Act was to prohihit cutthroat 
30 
competition. · 
24 
~he m in fe ture of the Clayton Aot is Seotion 2 Wh ich 
states that "i t sho.ll be unlawful for any person engaged in 
commerce to disor!minate in price between different purchasers 
of oomm.odi ties :vh are the effect of ouch discrimination may be 
to attbsta.ntially loss n competition ·and tend to create a monopoly 
in any line of oommeroe provided that nothing herein contained 
shnll prevent discrimination in price in the same or different 
communities made in good faith to meet competition." A further 
proviso iJl Section 2 stated that a difference in prices "on 
account of differences in the ~rade,. quality, or quan ity o~ 
the oormnodity sold., or that akea only due allo~tanc .~ for dif-
ference in the coat of Sellin or transportation shall n.ot be 
cons idered to be d1Sorimination.n3l 
The Senate Committee insisted on this proviso "to permit 
discriminat ion in good f a ith to meet com, tition', on the ground 
. 32 
t hat some discrimi netion vdll t end to promote com titon. 
~he ide bein presented VTas that some d1aori . ina.t1on enables a 
30see page 1. Chapter II. 
31clayton Act • Public No. 212 ~ 63rd Con ress (H. R. 15667} 
3~~und, it 3~8 
.m op.c •• P• ~ • 
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manufaoturer t o reach out i nto other sal es ar e s an compe te 
.1th di stant s ellers. By t he terms of the Act , price di fferences 
a.ro not illegal per se , but r t hor !Then the effect i s to ubstan ... 
tia.lly lessen oompet1 tion. Th v. ord substantially vas inser ted 
on the ground that the law 1as not concerned with t rifles . 
(b ) ~be Cl ayton Aot does not compel a one- price ~ l es 
policy* It left to t he courts the problem of deciding when 
oompeti t 1on was "subs tanti ally lessened n or Ylhan n r1ono:pol y 
was three.tening. In eddi tion to aiming at preda tory pri ce cut t i n 
,.ho'"'e object \7as to eliminate competition, the ac t ion al so 
s ought to prevont :price discri minat ion ~mich favored on set of 
customers and gave them a compet itive advantage over other dis t-
ributors. The emphasi e , hotvever, \.a ... on the curbing of monop-
ol1at1o powers in the fiel d of produc t i on. Like t h ~herman ot, 
the Clayton Aot and par ticularly Section 2 has had checkered 
cour se of enforcement. During the period i n '\7hloh chain stores 
"vera ~njoylng an e:xtonsi ve growth,. the courts held that discrim-
ination which injured only oompotitors of the buyer and not of 
t he seller was not sub ject t o the l aw. In 1.929 , hm7ever. the 
Supreme Court ruled i n tho Van Camp Case that t he section applied 
t t b. l. l 11 33- t ~ to a oompe 1 ion among uyers as \ G : as a~ . r. ~oep ,_or one 
t:t"iple damage sui t, the Ladoga Canning. Case 1n m ioh a buyer as 
permitted to recover substantial damages f .rom a seller who had 
discriminated against him and in favor of another customer, there 
3 3George Van Camp and sons v. American Can Co., 278 u. s. 
245, 254. 
34Amario a.n Onn Company v . Ladoga. Canning Company .,, 44F 2d 763. 
h s 'bo n littl e :nforcar.:mnt undei tlli s aeoti n . y - nd l r e 
this o otion had al most b co e a dead 1 t te r J>r ior to the 
Robinso . ... Patna:n Act . Vi r t ually no effort he.d been made ai t -1er 
by pr1 vato parties or by the e overnroa11t o us it to r.estr S'..i n 
the bu~;ring t c tics of eh,ain s tores . 
Oon...,roaa did not provi de eJJ.Y ru.l es to g vern i 
of pri c e di fferences . The qu.Gstion could be r aised to .ha.t 
G .. tent could a l oYter 1rrice mad to a. l e r ge b J.Yer be. de fcn cd 
26 
on tho round t a t i t ac u.all y was a quantity discount . G!"adun.lly 
e.vidonoa began t o a.ccumulat ;hich sho tled that 1· .rge sellers 
rJer making substantial price di f e r enoes bat een thei r au ... t ... 
omers upon the pretense of differ noes i n tho quantity purchased. 
This f a c t l od the Tlledersl ~ro.d. Commisoion to ·ndoavor to rel a te 
:priotl differences on account of qua.nti t y di reotl y ·to di ffe rences 
i n the cost of selli ng . 
?.urnoae of tpe ]tobins on .. Pe.tme.n Aot ... 
The co prehens i vo <tudy on chai n stores gev ri a to numerous 
pr oposal s i n Con r asa f or amandin ~ t he Clayton Act t o curb t he 
abuses of injurious qu.n.ntity price vari ances i nsofar a s they appear 
i n i nterst ate oommeroe. T 10 bill ... of i dent ical word i ng "",re r e int• 
roduo ed in June 1936• and after e tonai ve debate• long public 
bee.r~n s, and numerous amendmen ts , the t •.· o 'bills ere mer ed and 
adopted as the Rob1nson- Pa.ti n Ac t . l?re ai dent Roosevel t s i gned 
t he ne';· l e gi s l ation on June 19 , 1936 . Thi s l a:; became known as 
t he "Chai n Store Bill. " 
Sene.tor Lo an, Wh o ~ms i n char e of the bill i n the Genate 
sta ted ntha:t among the 1nany accompl ishments t o be eougl t i n 
'27 
thi s bill i s that quant ity discounts must be re ulated." s"O 
t hat the concern of tremendous purchasing p or n1ay not drive 
out of business everyone 1n the aama line as hi mself beoause 
35 his purohaaing power is so great that others oc.nnot oompe te. 
The purpo e of the Robinaon-.Patman Act as stated in the 
p.reamble to the bill when it ws.a int r oduced 1n Congress read: 
iak1ng 1 t unlawful for any person engaged in commerce 
to di scrimin""to i n price or terms of oala bat~ e n pur .... 
chasers of commodit ies of like grade and quantity and 
to protect the indepondent merchant , tha pu lie vhom 
he serves, and the manufacturer from Whom he buye ,from 
exploitation bv unfair competitor~ , 36 · 
The Sherman Aot was :passed because of fl idospread feeling 
agains t big business and fear of m.OllOpoly. The f orces of this 
early attack, ho-v7evar . was 11 bi · neE~s" in aolli ng. ~ho mpha.sia 
today hns shifted from the f i eld of produc ion to that of dis-
tribution. from "bigness" in se111flg t o 'bigness" in eying . 
mho country has become · l a.rmed at the poss1bilitios of dan er 
hich lies in the concentration of such tremendous buyi ng po1er 
as e"is ts in chain stor orgnnizati ons .... ha Hobi nson a tman Aot 
37 i s l arooely an oxprossion o.f thot fear . 1'he l a 7 ha.3 :four objectives: 
(1) ~-n equitable bas()' :for cus t omer clussifioatio • 
. ,
( 2) Uni orl!l tr a tmenij for o.ll cus t omers fo.l lin~ ,Ji t~n 
a given cl ass:i :fio a. ti on_. .. 
( 3) Elimina.ti on of pseudo - brokerage fees and oo mmiaaions .• 
(4) Equal treatment of buyers in recei pt of merclandising 
ervic e·s ax •. d. a llo -.rances fro 1 sellers . 
35congressior~l 'ecord • •pr il 28 , 1936• P• 6~87 . 
36rtright Patman, :£he Robinaon .. Ps.tman A.ot (!~~Y. : Roland :Pros e, 
1936 ). p.3. 
3 7zorn. op.oi t. • P• 67 
Tho 1 obiru on- Ps :mex1 Aot anon ed ·~ octi on 2 o:f the , Ol ay ton 
J...et. lhe o i i:nal Sec t ion 2 of t he Cl nyton 1 ot -Forbad price 
discriminat ion ..,hore thG ef:f'oot mey 'be to subet~ ntia.lly lessen 
oom;peti t ion or tend to ore te a. monopoly in any lhi of commerce. 
The nev1 Act ~eot1on 2 (a ) adds the phrase "or injure • . 
dest,..oy, or prevent oompeti tion w1 th any per·-on 
who ei the gr , nts or t:notringl y r ec ei vo.s the b en-
efit of euoh discrimination or nth ouotomers of 
<lither o · th m. Provided that no thino here i n co 1-
t ained. haJ.l prevent di fforonti als. m ich ' ke 
only ue allo ;anco for ifforono ~ in the cost . of 
munui'aoturew sale. or delivQry resulting from the 
di:f':ferine mo thod s or qu .nti ti s i n ·h ich •. mch com- 38 moditios a.:re to such pl.U'chaaQr s sold ox- delivered." · 
Thi s ne language makes i t absolutely clear that it i s the 
intended policy of Congress to protect more than the compatitlbn 
between producers and m ufao t urers, The amended la v goes beyond 
the Cl yton Aot1 in that it is not necessary to ahon that t he 
di scriminati on lessens competit i on in a ·hole l1na of oomme~oe . 
It i a enow:;h to sho .1 th t oompeti t 1on 1i th certain persona i s 
injured-, destroyed, or prevented . 11he preoiaa me aning of t his 
l anguage 7111 be made only through decisions of t he Commission 
and the courts. 
he addition to Section 2 was me.de primarily to J>revent 
t he unfair pr aotic6 sometimes used by a chain store in openin 
e. branch in a given looali ty • and than cut.ting prices to d a troy 
38 Robinson-Patman Aot; l?ublio No. 692 •. 74th Oo ress. 
an inde vendent reta iler . 39 The ne>r1 roviso 1n Beotion 2 on 
quantity die.o ounts v1aa expl e ined by the House Commi ttoe s 
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follo s: 
~is proviso is of g;re t i miJO:rtance; for • hila 
it le ves tra de and i ndustry free from any re-
.str1ot1on or impe i ment to the adoption ~nd use 
of more economic proceosas of manufv.oture, me thods 
of sal e ; nd modes of deli very, :rherasoever t hey 
may be employed in stre s of proa.uction or dist-
ribution, it el o 11 · ts tbo uae ·Of quantity prioe 
diff 7~:-.. en '· i B.l s to tho spher o· o.ctu{' · co at if er-
en.oea-. Other i11se such differentials vr10uld become 
· i nstrumen '" of f ·. or d pr i ilo . e un ~·o •. , .ons of 
oom:pGtitive oppre"'sion. 
29 
It 1 1n t he sp.ec.ifio extension of protection t o the 
individual that tho Roblnson-Fatman .Aot invades now legi sl tive 
terri tory . 'J:he sponsors of the .. ot felt that thG difficulty of 
proving a subs tantial l essening of comp tition or a tendency to 
creat e a monopoly rsiaed an insuper bla barrier in all but the 
most fl agr ant ORoaes . They direot d t heir ttention to the prob-
lems of amplifying thG l anguage so a.a t o include protection to 
an individual customer ·o might be injured by discrimina tion, 
but llo . oUld have no rem dies under the language of the old 
Clayton Aot. They soujbt to supplement the anti• trust theor y 
of unreasonable restraint of t de by tho Federal Trade Comm• 
isaion conception of unfa ir cor,· ,:titon. It extends the regulati on 
of competition to the individual in 
pe titlve equality . 
effort to preserve com-
ressional Record, June 15, 1936 - p. 9417. 
D IIHS' RATI OH OE THE RO 
ACT 
-
I (a) 1:'hia aha1)te:r i ll eX!Jl a in tha ndminis tro.tion of 
the Robineon-pa t ma.n Act • I t wilJ. shovr the Feder al -Tr ade Oom-
mi aaion ' a attam . t to se t up 11 ts for quanti t di scounts 
30 
~here :l t i s doe . -d neo~ssa.ry. It has been shorm i n the pr evious 
chap ter bo·1 t he Federal Tr a de Commission had b een entrust'!d to 
protect and maintain our :fr.ee oompoti tive oe italistic system. 
II!th t he pass- ge of the Robinson•Pa.tman Act. the activi t ies 
and responai bil1 t 1ea of tll Commission h ve bean enl r gened. 
In the debate and hea.rlnes for t be passa. e · of the _ tl• 
Discriminati on Aot. quanti ty discount and its ef fec t on comp-
etition ~as on~ot the in t opics. 
The Quantity L1rn,1 t ?rov l so of the .. Bobl nson-P t msn li e~ .. 
(a) One of the proposed d~afts of the new le isla tlon 
on quantity di scount s prohibited the grant in of di s eour.lts 
on quanti ties purcha.sad in excess of a carlot • 11 idea a s 
that there should be some limit beyond whioh quanti t y di ffer-
ent1als should not be 
~he :principl e has lon _ been f oll0 1ed by the I ntersta te 
Con:merce Commission, in regulaM_ng r ailroad Rates, and 1 t O'a s 
believed tho.t it \ ov.ld be sound :publi c policy t o ke s. si i la.r 
l 
requirement for industrial prices. Thi s proposal brou ht f orth 
1 
Roaring before the C o~tt a on he Ju . ciary, ~Amend 
.The Cla.y_ton !g!. House of R.epres ntatives , '14th Con res s ; 
~ira - sessi on , 1 35 , p. 27 . 
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aonc i ernblo op osition £r om or 1n~a i ndus try , oups , an 
a odi f i er~~i on of the or-.rlot uanti t · i mi t pro iso s 
'!'a:fted . 
The na , dra~t ss e a t of Secti on 2 ( a.) of th 
R . inaon-P t an Act a rea. .n as ollo 7S : 2 
l?rov:t o , 0 1: e o.· , a t t c 3~ er ace Co i .Js .on 
may. after due investigation an hearing t o all tnt-
rest d p :rt os , fi~ , n o t -blish quant ·;y liru. ,u, 
and reviee the sano s it finds neoeasar· , _as to par-
ticu ~r eorr.ttno :t. ion , or c. asses of cor. . o i + .0'·1 , · .. e ra 
! t finds that e.va1l able purohv.aera in greater q1.1ant .. 
1t1 s o.re so :re , s to render diffar ent i l s n cc -
ount thereof un3ustly diaorimine.tory or promotive of 
m nopoly in nrJ$ line of commerce; un ~h fore 0 :tn 
shall then not be construed to permit differnnt i la 
b <:!Qd on iffar~ ces in u rmtiti .s greater t · au tlos 
ao ixad and established• 
This provtao makes it pos e1 ble to pass on to the purchaser 
an.v eoonom1es in ooe t he my be entitled to , by reason of hie 
om actions or methode of buying. Tb,e buyer. cannot, ho ever , 
uoeroa a seller into gr auting hi a lower prioe t han thos e 
econQmies amount t o. 
'/bile under ordinary oiroumstancea, and :ln the absence 
of a f ew large mass buyers in a _ivan industry , this l i it-
ation would suff1oe, t he proponents of t he Aot believed that 
in s pite of t h i s eoonomioa.lly a ou.nd 11 1 tation, there was real 
danger that the intent and purpose of the Aot vould be nulli-
fied . 
( ) The reason for this i s found in the background history 
2Robinson-Fa.tman ot, Public ~o . 692 - 74th Congress-
( H.. R • 8442 ) • 
3 Vright Pat an , 1~e ff.obinson- Pat man Aot (N.Y.: Ronald 
Press Co •• 1938 J, p . 264. · · --
o:f t he . ct itself* T'tlo :ong:rassional inv stiga.tion of tho 
. .o.,,. 
buying precti<HiS of' Ch rd GtO:L'E:l8 officiall y ostablish-:.d <:>. 
fact tha t ·as widely kno n among mewbers of industry and 
comme:t~ce .~ Tb !nvostiga.tio shm-;od tltct there e 1 t ed 
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single organizations and corporations mo i n ividually accounted 
for tens of millions and hund.reds o:f millions of < oll ars of 
retail bus1nos "• 0Jl· cor})Or · tion e~lone represented nearly one 
Billion dollars ·Orth of l"' tail .. l es . 6 
en thoug' the ct 11 . t9 sue .. c orations to the. b en-
efits of the oavi ngs their tna. s pure:. aai n . p ·er mi t lee i t-
imatel y earn for then •· it was re lized the volu.rne of bu.;inesa 
involved i n their buyi nu migh show such a rea t savin by t he 
unreasonable extension of discount soales that . the trend to mrd 
monopoly and estruction of compe tition would continue in spite 
of t he obinson•Pt;t.tman Aot . It ...,vas eared t hat t he r already 
e 1st d i n many 1ndUDtr1os a :few buyers \'7ho coul d buy in such 
l arge quantities and could le o-ally obtain such low prices as 
to null ify the ct . 
Aft or muob discussion 1 t was with :full kno ~ledge the. t the 
facts and circumstances i n each oaee mi J bt vary • that the Fed-
eral ra.do Corn. ·asion was authorized to set up thea limits. 
(c) no unrea ona.ble author! ty v1a.a delegated to the Feder 1 
'rrade Commission. 6 It must oanduct a. "due and ampl e" investi-
gation. It rouat hold a hearing a t v1hich all 1nterosted parties 
op.o.i t . • · p . 256 . 
ay have - n o:pportuni t~r to be _c ure. . It must :find t .t there 
e_ 'i st onl r a feVl :purchasers who buy tho commodity j_n ue t1on 
in unusually lar~e quanti ties. It must :find that th .,~lvi:ng 
in :price ore ted by puroht:.oi n~~ l n · these unusu lly l a r ge q n-
ti tics ghue tho purcnasers a substt:'.nti l com t i iv, adva t 
in co ,m ·ce . It lBt date:rm · ne t ~a.t this uubsto.n ial n. . nta e 
i s unjustly dis. ril · natory or i s promotive of mono pol " i n s wa 
lino. 
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·laving clot ?r no all o th ue questions in th a fi rmn.t1ve, 
· t 1e l!'ederal .~.ra <l. Commission muy fix o.ud stablish quunti ty 
limit"' v;hich it believeo .ill .., ev nt un ·ust iscri ··no. ion 
or remove the danger of monopol • It n y keep 1 ts thumb on those 
lini ts an- oh ng tho af.l o n 1 tions m.rrant . r:henever uanti ty 
li 11 ts are established in this anne·r , they shall thon be th 
top limit beyond nb.i oh :fl.lr .,her quantity discounts -hall not ba 
!!us.de . 
T:Lis q_ua.nt i ty limit · :roviso , therefore , 
"•-is not de~1gnod to confer upon the Commission 
c :r to l < no he a thori ty to ~ egUla qu.( 1 · dis -
counts Pit ou. rule or guid , but only to pe~i t 
it ,t :f'L limi ta ill ~uo.n i uiOS for rlhich qv. tity 
price differential s !"'Ia$ bO ["r r:.ntod .• 0 Ui dad by the 
pl'i nc i l e 1 ng reoo lized in nti ... trttst l e:t. a min .. 
i s trat:i.on: that . th economi es o; more s ize do not 
~us ify t"~c r is. : of nono oly . " 
Thi s :pr . Yi eo J:E-;.~.locts the i ing deairo of Congress to 
preserve a '~re uyc t m of' ---~ oee . a pri at property 
~idoly ai ftusod in m rl3 hvntls . ·'ven hough l arge c obination 
might e ;~.ble to co . sinoso so e ha ore h a. 1 throu;h l a r ge 
7comm1 tte of !l.1he Judiciar y , Prohibition of Price Discrim-
inat i on. 74th Congress, second ae.aa{on. H'ouserepo r t J'o. 2887, 
B"tiroh '31, 1936 • J>. ll. 
nor~ bu.yi ng t ll ..  n e. s 1a .l er ~ l.vt>.l , on~r .ss as ill in-:- o 
S •. cri f i.O thi S a.dVfl.n t .• ~e i n Or~or tO VOi d h f.Ter ter SOC! .. 1 
8 
. s t o . rri vRtA monopoly • 
. · oreotre , . ht J1l"Ovi s o i s d. at gne t o "n bl . , ·_en nec-
ef:! e.:ry , t .e otermin tion o qt nti ty limi t s . a to var i o s 
c o . o tior , e .. ona r-1 i ch QUHrJ t ~,r pr:loo diff.er.er~ti alc ~ t' l l 
not be . it .e ven t o n por t o b ci :f.'cro ceeo n cont • 
.· ·:T. r A"' t s upon t he .. r t c1.pl o 
, . 
'
1 t . n '!he ro o ~n n a<t'litted ceo 10m.v l c: of 
chure.c t er that it i s possi bl e only t o o. very 
fat"- un i ts o over s. 1. o-.: nz s i ,o i n s · , .. t ic-
ular trade or industry , i t may bacome in t h ir 
c~ · 8 1 10n tho l e f3 1 . ~0 :f'Q O U P On • 1iC- rJfnQ Y 
feeds • a. probosci s t hrough wh1.oh 1 t s aps the 
l i fe lo of 1 cs com t ;ors ; n th t i n for-
bidding its use and for egoing it s benef i t s t he 
u lie L but pay nr:, a v. lin§! ~ice t or i t 
f reedom from monopoly o t rol. A si milar limi t -
a t! n h.k"" een -pp11ed .. 1 tho t c . llcn _ e for 
nearly h al f a century in the f ield o:f tr nsp-
ort.t l n , in r · fu~ int t o s en f r 1. ht rat o i -
f erentia l s beyond the ca r lot q11a.nt tty . u9 
In Se.nator Lor_,an• s ~ or ds : 
"~ o appl y such e. bl anke t ·11m1tat1 on ·to quant i t y 
prio e :! f' ren ti l s in the oommo .1 ty fi -~ 1 , a ems 
at present un o.rrantod , si nce s i mil'"'r protecti on 
mgy not no\ e neod tv:i. t h refe r ence to .,11 coi:l-
mod1 t1es, nor as t o s ome may i t ever be ne eded , 
a H . in . a.s i t do · s u :on such qu.ostions o:f fact 
a o the di s tri buti on of bus i ness i n the i ven lin e 
,. on::. 1 ... r ge .nd. "'11 compe t 1 torn . r ho e r ea 
to which peculia r economi es. are technically poa• 
nible onl y to those comr~ ti t ors of oversb a. o rl. 
aide. The prov i a o oomm1 t s t o t he e d.eral ·~rade 
Comm1 s1on t h e poqer to uet i n the pr ises s sn 
whe n the need ariGe a . and t o aot a ppr opt•i a t ely to 
the nat ur e of the ne ed, $-:fter f8sse asi n 1 t s elf 
of a l l :per t1 nc n t i nf ormo. ti on. u 
31 
8Vornon A .. liund, Government And Bus iness L .Y.: Harpe r .bros., 
1950), ...- • 3J.l:2 . 
9co~mitto on t he Judi qi a ry 1 To Amend the Cl ayjon Act, 74th Congress. second session, uenat.e r eport No. 1502, an. 16, l936, p .6. 
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Se . tor r~oge.n i n ohKcge ~ ·&he Act on the .~loor of the Senate 
.,. t 1 11 s ua ec , 
u _ _ the l ""reer the :.fiTChasir:t powe r , t h 0 rCO. ter 
t ho qu ant i t ie s pu:r:-ohaaed . until eventua lly t he 
qu.tlnt i t .ies JH.lr 11 :;;of ,mn., · be oo gr :.. r~t tha t thc 1•o 
will bo praot !oully no oompe:ti t i on in. tba.t par-
t icu l -. r f:te l , :iJ':l n ii"'u:~ 'L cond ition ~~risec , · .~.. e1l 
purchasers may purohe.ae in auoh l arge quanti ties 
i;hat otb ors e.r shut of:f ; therefore • ·,_, .~.c oth r~ 
cannot get tho l)en f i t of tb.st d..is c ount . nd r 
t '1e ~~on i n • .: on-P~ ii a1 Bill t_w Federal ~:r.o. e Corr -
miss1o:n is ';:(uthor ize< ·o f i x a qti,s.:nt i ' li!;J . t 
above '7hic1 t1 ere ~hall e no quant i ty di ocount . " 
In i s c uRsi n qu.~.:nt 1t y J.ir1i t o. ion . Jutl g .. Cooley . the f i rs t 
Cha i. n o:t: the Intar stat "' Co ,unerc e Commi ssi on, and on of the 
g reatest j uri · t s in 1.m(:r io~ 1 h i s ory rene eroa a deci ion a l.i• 
oablo to our situation .. In the l)'tovidcn ce Coal Co . v . Fr ovi a.enoe 
And :. 'ostorn Ra.i l r o d (I I . c •. c._ 107 ) • uhich was o cava -:J 1era t he 
o, r.rier g -ve a discount from i ts r:hUla.r O!.t:rload c oal r at e s t o 
cor!lpanioo who to ok mor e th m SO, OOO tone per ye· r . J udge Coolay. 
n prohi biting the disc riminat i on •. sai d.S 
t'A i sorimin~tiOJ:1 'Hhich should s o l i mi t; the o"'f.er 
t he t a pa.rt of t hove v1ho cou:t. c ... d ... i gh t . Dire t o 
ace ~r t it rroul . b o excl udod :"r om it ~J bonefi t s woul d12 
_ or t h .. v very r ea.non l1e t ~unt and und··"'e .. .~.~ible • " · 
( d ) ~ i .. ore ~:li ll ·t;h ·- tl e :;.:-. .... 1 Tr ade Oou1I:liBsi on so·t tLe quan-
t ity limi t ?13 !t -. · ll dc1-- n:1 e ~rLoll;.l U};) Oll t he a vid n c "' in each 
ca>.)c • nnd .ttU'lY f'"".c torv must be taker in o can ~id ration. The 
l b 
.,e ort o.('! SOl:l" to Commi ttee on t ho u · i c ia.ry , p . 6. • June 
l 93 6t spoltan by Senato r Logan • . 
l l c ongr essi onal Haoo r d.1 Vol • 80• P• 5696• 
12 
· l~epox· t of the reart 
24 .. 25 . 
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8-l-:-. d: cv\J. \::l i;·ii J?ato ... Le fut ::-e :J.,:..v-.lor,lont o:r ·~ro • u-·tr· ··:d. 
'Cj c ' ~1- ctl on in w' llCh it i n nov in;:, . t ~·r' . 11 rlY" -'t;c t J 
ec onomic V c .,. ,round o:r e ach 1 :co lohl · ,.: •s n · . 
\l. con;.:; 
:p:.. ic . J.imi t"' will h~vo on oi t · r o. tl a ·1, 
.'\.11 o_ t'. l~'H'C ::'actors rJ1mt :>e ta:Xcn in lio co:nsi eJ.~ t · on :in d to r • 
o~r.dnt, ·, '_are tho muxi • qtt:~nt:i.ty liiZli ts :Jhoul be oe t . 
vti ll not be int .. rostca i n u pset t i .ne tr >de 
;;r a.ct icCJs , ' ·nc m · n que ' · i onn thj.oh cnn he o:tp8c t a. t o intero ·- t 
it are thcso ,14 Have . protion-'t~ log-::.1 qtH=tnt i'liy pr:lc a dif e:eentl ~-~l s 
raoul t d i n sue . n s . read bet-r.,eon n f ~7 h.rge cone · n' 11d the 
romainino m.~ mh r., o:: tLe industry as to hsve bec o un. uutl y 
di s c riminatory; and , a re such dif:f'eY"entia.l ~~ beyond r oa son "Jlo 
qu.anti tios r omotbre of _ onor~oly ? 
i!.'ver case of thi s na tur e will probabl y havo . d i f f' r ant 
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set of cond itions ani backgr ound, Di fferant commodi t ies 
will be involved, Di f fering methods ll$Y be at s t ake . Each oe.ae 
will have t o be dealt wi th on its oun merits. The Federal Tr ade 
Commi ssion offers t he mos t pr a.ot1ca1 means of determini ng t he 
f aots and conditions as they ariee, 
Up to the present t he Cotnmiaaion has not f ixed quant i ty 
15 limi ta for any commodity. - It has ins tituted only one suoh 
proceeding, In July 1948 1 it directed that an investigation 
b~ made of t he ;rubber tire indus try for t he purpos e of det-
ermining whether it should f i x quantity l i mits for automobile 
tires.16 
The effect of a quantity limit rule depends upon ·which of 
t wo alternative oons truotions i s given to the provi so, The 
firs t, and it i s believed the correct, cons truction i s that 
t he quantity limi t proviso 1a solely a limi t ation upon the c ost 
proviso.17 Under thi s oonstruotio:n a quantity l:l.mit rule has 
no direct or enforceable effect. Its sole function i s to im-
plement t he final olauae of the pr oviso which make s t he cost 
def ense unavailable a.a to diff erential s based on quanti tie a 
exceeding the limit fixed• A delegation of legisl ative power 
must be construed strictly , and the defi ned affect of t he rule 
mak~ng aut horized presumably was intended to be exclusive . 
16oyrus Aust1n1 Price: Diaori mination and Rela ted Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act ( Mitiadelphia: American Law Ins ti t ute • 1966), P• 7'!. . . . - . - - . 
16Ib1d •• p . '11. 
l'/Ibi d •• P• 72t 
(e) hat the quantity limit proviso modifies only the 
cos t provi so i s fUrth r indioatod by the eormeotion of the 
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t o provisos by the o s nFrovide4, 1ioweve:t. '1 Each of t he 
subsequent provisos o:t ~ection 2 (a) i s preceded by the 1ords 
"And provided, further." If this explanation is correct, then 
a. quant ity lim1 t rule does not a.fteot t.he requix-ements of a 
prima f aoie ease , nor the defenses, other than cost justi:fi-
oe.ti on, available to the reap<>ndont ., in a section 2 (a) pro-
oeedin • 
The a.l terna ti ve cons truo t i on of the proviso i s th t a 
quantity limit rule i mpl ements the affirmative prohibitions 
of Section 2 (a); that the prtion of the proviso preceding the 
semi-colon has in that respect an independent substantive effect; 
and that the clause followtn . the semicolon i s only cumulat1ve.18 
Under this oons truotion, the finding that differential.s 
based on purchases of the particular commOdity in quantities in 
excess of the limit are unjus tly discriminatory or promotive of 
monopoly is given statutory force. the efteat bein to define 
auoh differential s ae different i al s n ich re affirmatively 
prohibited. 
Of t he t wo e:x:pl anation.a, the former i e more aouna . 19 ~'he 
affirmative prohibitions of Seotion2 {a) do not require i mple• 
· mentation, and there ie no express author! ty for such i mplemen-
t ation •. The Commission t s euthoriaed only t o "fix and establish 
18Aust1n., op.ait, • P• '13. 
l9Ib1dr; P• 74 •. 
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quanti ty lirni ta" and the f i nd! _. a as to the unjustly or 
monopolis t ic effeot o£ the differential s ia only find 1ng nee ... 
eeear y to val idate the king of the rule • It i s t he rule, not 
the findi ng, wbich has foroe ancl the .f'feot. 
' 
CHA T."'R IV 
\ HA~ ARE ~U lfT I TY Di wCOUNTS? 
I. (a) This chapter will attempt to show ., and point out, 
by concrete examples tho ttain types of quantity discounts 
and bO'IJ their existence 1s restrioted by the Robinson-Pat .. 
man A.ct men they tend to be d1sor1mina.tory. 
f he Rob1nsOn•l?atma.n Aot orig!n.a.ted out of e. desire to 
prevent ohain stores and other l arge buyers from securing 
excessive and unconscionable advantages ove:r their smaller 
competitors b7 virtue of their size and pttrohssin power 
irrespective of their efficiency or their real ability to 
1. 
serve the public. !rhis means. primarily, that excessive 
quantity discounts in the form of unfair price disori ruin-
a.tions are illegal; this point being &Jilphasized in Section 
2 (a) of the Act. 
I 2 (b) Section 2 (a) reads as follows: 
The.t it shall be unlawful for any person en a ed in 
commerce in the oou:tse of such oonJJleroe, either dtreotly or 
indiroctly, t o discri nate i n price between diff rent pur. 
chasers of commodi ti~s Of like gr ade e.nd quali ty • here 
either or any of the purchases i nvolved in suoh diaor1min-
at1 on, are in commerce, ~ ero suQh commodi ties are so l d f or 
use, con umpt1.on •. or resale, and Ybere the effect of euoh 
d1scr1 nation may be substant i ally to lessen competition 
or ten to or a.te e. monopoly 1n any line of oommeroe. or to 
in3ure, d etro , r prevent oompe tition \71th any p rson v. ho 
either gr ants or knowingly receives t he benefit of such dis• 
o.rimination . or . th customers of either of them; provided , 
that nothi na her in contained shall pr,event differentials 
nbioh mak only due allo anoe f or differences 1n the cost of 
rnanufeoture t sal , or d liv ry reeultin from the diff ering 
methods or quanti t i es i n rmloh suoh oommodi tie s are to such 
purchasers sold or dtUiv red •. 
1 
anjamin rne 1 Business And The obinaon•Patman Act ( U. Y.: Oxford University Presa.;193B}.p. 39• · -
2Rob1nson-Patman Aot - Public ~o. 692 , 74th Congress . 
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( o) It may be asked, 1 What 1a meant by price Diacrim-
!nation?' Underlyt the nea.ning of word discrtminat1on is 
not. a mere difference, but the idea that some "relationshi p 
exists bet een the parties to the diecri mination hich ent 1 tles 
them t o equal treatment, Whereby the difference granted to one 
casts some burden or disadvantage upon the other. I:f' the two 
are competing in the resale of the goOds concerned, that rel-
ationship exists. \'here, a lso, the prioe to one is so lo as 
to involve a. eaori:fice of some part of tho seller • s necessary 
coste and profit a.a applied to that business, it leaves that 
deficit inevitably t o be made up in higher prices to hie other 
customers; and there. too, a relationship may exist upon mich 
to basf) the charge of discrimination. But \vh ere no such rel .. 
ationsbip exists ~there the goods are sold in different markets 
and the conditions affecting those markets set different price 
levels for them, the sale to different customers at those dif-
ferent prices mul.d not oons ti tute a d1scr1 rninati on within the 
me$ning of the Act . The bill ~rohibita suoh discrimination 
where either or any of the purchesers involved in such diacrim-
ifl&tion are in interstate oommeroe,3 
It seems that the courts will decide t hat only such prioe 
variations constitute discrimination aa are "unreasonable", or 
undue, or without just oe.uee or exouse, and would exempt those 
which a.re not .(~bin the s pirit or purpose of the Aot . 4 
The e .. naore of the Aot felt that certa in differences in 
prices to cus tomers were proper and economically juetifia.ble . 
:~.:he - cost proviso -is inserted in Section 2 (a) of the Act, which 
perni ~s a limited degr e o:t discrimination between competing 
customers. Cost difference 1e the yardstick adopted to measure 
the permissible a .. t ent of the diaorimi.nation. As such. 1 t re-
3
oongreasmsn Utterback, 80 Congressional Record 9416, (1936) 
4 
t erne. ~ cit,. P• 41, 
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qUires that the person d._.fending the discount affirmatively 
est lbli ab that savings in cost justify a :particular discount 
or louer price to a favored customer. The burden is on him to 
show the specific savings i n cost. Only those coat differences 
which flow fro (l) different methods o:f sale or. delivery or 
(2) different quantities sold may be used as justification. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the precise degree 
of flexibi11 ty which this px-oviso sllov.rs, it is necessary to 
discuss what demonstrable differences in co s t were to be the 
measure of prom.iasible discrimination i n price. Some differ-
ences in price hed to be permittedt since it , ould have been 
impossible to justify a reqUirement that the buyer of hal f .. 
dozen lots be accorded treatment as favorable as on.e uho pur-
chased in lots of ten thousand. Some yardstick had to be pre-
scribed which could separate such "justifiable" differences 
from those intended to be forbidden. For this purpose .cost 
was a convenient and locioal choice. The adoption of cost aa 
a permissible price diffe:renca is a mntter of l egi sl ative ex-
pediency entirely divorced from any question of bstr ct eco-
nomic theory. 
II. e m~y aek, ' 7hat are coste?' coats enjoy the paradoxical 
position of being definite and at the same time variable. 5 
m ary article in commerce has accumulated certain definite 
elements of cost in the processes of its product ion and distr-
i bution. At the same time the elements of pr icing with hioh 
we are oomernad must ·include also n forecast of what cost ill 
5 
· right :Patman, fl%' . Robins on-Po. tman .!£! ( N • Y • : ... . onal d 
Press Co., 1938) , p. , • 
43 
e.ccumulete in a.n articl e by the time it passes out of our 
ends into the hands of a purchaser. Thereupon e encounter 
·~t 
t he var1eble factors of costs arising out of ful.bre processes. 
Those varia. le factors are most heavily affected by unpredi.ct• 
able overhead costs to the extent at least of the · ount of 
overhe~cl or in ireot coat t hat shall be charged against a par-
ticular ttn1 t or article. The o:verhead cost hioh must be 
char ed against n prOduct usually varies in inverse rati to 
the number of units handled~ The smaller the number h!ndl ed , 
the higher the overhead ratio. As the units increaae .in number 
t he overhead ration per unit decreases . but it decrea ea as 
well on the units shipped to the small purchaser aa it does 
on the units shipped to the ma.as buye:r, 
pplying the concept of coat to handling and warehousing 
as the volume of business increases . the cost per unit recedes 
. 6 all alon~ the line. ery unit handled must bear i ts share. 
As t he unites increeae in nttmber, the individual a are becomes 
les.s c: nd t he selling priee may be lot erad in i reot proportion 
to the decrease in oost o:f each unit . 
·~ It is thus th t the eoonomio d ·:.-' erenoes in coat cornea 
r·=»:; 
into pl ay • The Robinso.n-Pe.tmon Ac; t prohibi te t he imputation o:f 
overhead coats to one number or collection of units and the ex-
'1 
elusion of it from anoth r number of collection of units. 
0Patman-. £h. oit., p. 13. 
7see deotio~: 2 {a) of the Robin ... on ... :Pe.tme.n Act. Chapter IV, p .l • 
. t(' 
The Aot reqUires t he maintenance of sound coat-finding 
princi.plea and intends that cost , within the meaning of that 
Act., shall be determined on such a basis that any tota l num• 
ber of unit subjected. to total overhead cost within a spec ... 
ifie length o:f time shall bear that overhead coat . share and 
8 
share alike , in determining t he Sellin price per unit. 
Materials and labc~ costs usually may be accura t ely pre-
9 determined, Raw mat eri al markets and purchase invoices pro-
44 
vide t he determilmtion of t he former. In many industries some 
form of piece•rate wage soale pre.va ils and provides a ready 
s ource for the l atter. Di:f'ferenoes in the coat of r aw materials 
may arise from two sources: (1) t he quantity in which supplies 
may be pttroha.sed and (2) the time at which purchases may be 
made. In t he pr edetermination of overhead o.osts there must be 
estimated t he probable production or volume of units or sale 
'Which may r easonably be expected wi t h in a given :period. 
III. Price Discriminati on -. 
Every mallil r and form of price discriminati on i s covered 
by the Act i n the ~vords "either directly or i ndi r ectly" found 
in the aa:;:·ly pa.;r t of S oti on 2 (a.) •10 It therefor e oovars not 
only qusn i ·ty discounts and quantity prices. bu.t oa.ah and trade 
8seotion 2 {a), JU1!. o1t1 • P• 1. 
9J?stman, ..2,h. oit, • P• 18~ 
10 . . Section 2 (a), Chapter IV, P• 1. 
dia.oounts, a.dverti ain e.llowanoes , a.nd s rvice allO\I eno s 
of e.ll . inde , Tr 1 . formn of pric~ t11scriminati on nre t hose 
usually designated by the te rms of qua.n 1 ty di soounts or 
qu J...nti ty prices , 
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r unntity discounts are not prohi bita ·-neither ar e they 
reauired., If m de , the. · is no ob 1ga.t1on to ma.ke them . to the 
· '":·~ . 
full extent of ny savings i n cost , 'l'he Act, howe er . apecif'"" 
i c l l y requires t hat . i f quantitJ discount l" 1 ven, the;v 
must not be mora than the s vi nga in cost or a l eas ust 
make "only due" a.llooe..nce for such sa.vi a . This r equirement 
as to cost creates rest 1ff1cult1es. Som indus tries believe 
that there ts litt le t>r no real savt ngn a between l a r g and 
small order s, and would vie 1 w1 t h equar.\1 1ty and probably 
reli~f ttn opportunity to gat r id of qu ntity discounts lto-
gether.11 
1noe many of the e ·is t in discount structures ar e the 
result of compet i t ive pl'essu.re of hist orical development , t hey 
do not in rnany instances bear any relationship to demonstrable 
cos aavtngs.l2 bis ha.a been hen the l arge buyer has been 
able to force hi a own ter s upon the supplior. 1~e immediate 
problern of t ho seller )Vh o s eks to mrura the pract 1oes conform 
11 Zorn an :F el (U.Y.t Prentice-Hall 
Under :1:he le Price La s 
P• l'u7-:- --
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to the 1 r:~ i s to examine his discount structure an_ eliminate 
those discounts '."lhich clearly ap:penr to exceed . xi mum savings. 
Many varieties and types of discounts ra preva lent in 
business today. 
(a) The straight• quant i ty ·discount is the most fr quently 
used foro of discount in business . It y be defined e.s "a non-
cumulat ive di scount" v1hioh is based upon th~ dOll r amount 
ought at single time and usually elivered at a si 
An exampl e of a. straight-quant ity discount 1s: 14 
Purchases 
6-29 lb· • 
30-149 l bs, 
150-749 lbs. 
750 or moro 
Price 
mse price 
1¢. less -per lb. 
2¢' less par lb, 
2 i¢ leas per lb, 
13 le place, 
This aehedule is typical of the usue.l s-traight discount, 
which provid a for progrossively larger deductions, e.s quan-
tities · increase. The problem in each oa.ae is t o deter-mine 
whether or not a particular discount exoeads otunl savings in 
coat resulting :t:rom the puroheaa of larger q:uant itias. It is 
easier to deter ine th i S question in the oa.se of straight quan-
tity disoounts than in the moro complex types of discounts hich 
.ill be mentioned l ater. 
A manufacturer can determine vme·her or not a particular 
discount exceeds any possible cost Justification by asking him• 
self auoh questions: Is t he item s old a stock item or one made 
13 Freer. Acoou.ntin,g I:roblems J!.n~er j,'he Rob!neon ... P tman Act 
in Unfair Trade Pre.otloee (st.Pe.ul: ;est .J?ubiiahing IIouae, 19'60), p. i"028. 
l4zorn, op.· cit., PP• 158-160. 
to order? If it ! a a stock item, are there an.y peci f!c dif-
ferences i n m&nufscturin cos t i'ih ich can be att r ibuted to t he 
l arger quantity? 'hat i s the m nimum production run in te:rms 
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of qu t1ty units? In many ins tances , it will be found discount 
schedules have sually been adopted for t he pur pose of promoting 
sales rather than paasi n s:pocific savings to the uanti ty 
buyer. Di scounts a.llo"Wed i n order t o i ncrease business are not 
:permissibl e under tl~e Act 1 unless t he co rts . r mi t n frank 
pushin · allo11e.nce rnnde on " roport ionally equal" torms to other 
15 
customern ., 
It has been au gested t hat the Act requires very n rro 1 
spaci ng of d1scotmt i ntervals. 1'h1s suggestion proceeds on the 
t heory that the Act requires comparison bot 7een any t o custo-
mers. If t he purchases of one are just short of t he discount 
line, and the purchas s of t he other just above it, this ~11 
1 ave the seller open to ohe.r a of di scrimination. ex mple 
of this i s a commodity pricGd at ·1.00 with a discount schedule 
of l o% for 1000 units or mor • A purchaser mo takes 950 unite 
16 
w111 pay ·i?950.oo. \'.nerea.s one ta ng 1060 un1 ts Vlill pay 945.00. 
{b) Cumulat ive Discounts -
Cumu t ive discounts exist in a variety of forms . One o:f' the 
mos t f mil1ar i s the cumulative discount "With e. quota. specified." 
Thi s i s usually a percents. a d1 scount ba.sed · on total purchases 
l6z :tt 1~9 orn ,. .2.12!. S,.,_,!.• p . ·> • 
16 Ibidt• P• 160. 
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made durin~ the particular riod ... li. ·eek., e. · . onth, or a year -
... _ and l,.s !..,. r c.nte only if the total :purc11 s r oach h s oci f ied 
minimum. 
ln some instano o 1 t takos t he form o .... a lo er tu1i t price 
r a t har than a parcent(.;j,ge discount .• vomet:t mes 1 t is gr ... ted in 
a.ddit iou to the regular qunnt ity diocot t, 
I llustrations are n diacoUrit t 5% on oll pu:rch'1ses of .;,so.oo 
or mo:ro if the total purch .... s o exceeded ·'2 11 500.oo per roar . In 
to chain otores , th aamo concern · lo\.od d additional 
5~ on purchases of -~50 .00 o:r mo:ro if the tot 1 exceeded 5 ., 000 
per year. 
A sii!lplo type of oumula. t i ve discount. to; 17 
l"u.rohases p,a;r month 
;;16 or le s 
, 16-·· 50 
-:ro0-~200 
'J,i200 Ol"' ovor 
..,.D.-i .. s_.c,...o..-un;;;;; .... t rom 11 st 
Thia type of discount 1s int&nded to i nduoe c sto ers to 
oonfi n their ·purohaaee to a particular deal er and to pro ote 
sales. Cumul ati.ve d1sootmts o£ t his type a.r& 'not diati uiahable 
from a strai ght-quantity d~soount . They are proper only i f they 
can be justifie d by savings in cost and di stribution. :i:he: arg .... 
ument tha t t hey ccnsti tuta in tan i .ble benefits to the seller 
and increase hi s patronage does not a.ttoi"d justification under 
the oost proviso. In oat of these cumulat ive discount schedules 
/ 
there is no ao•ordi na.tio.n whatever bet een the c ustomer's 
uro1 ases par month . or ye ~ r , 
seller . 
d the vi n s in cost to the 
{e) Increases~ aalae over_ nr~oedin6 ngri od : 
This i s a var1 t ion of the cumula t ive discount . ~he usual 
pl an i s to g1 e e eu tomer as . ci a l discount if hi s purchases 
dur i ng one period 1norec s ed beyond. the total ree,ehed du:rinOI' 
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some receding ye r. One ell lmO\"'!l'l com:pv.ny o.llo a. certain t ype 
of rett..il buyer a 30% di scount . but i ncreases this to 40% i f 
t he purchases durin a par ticular year are at least ·· 500 more 
. 18 
then t hose made in the preoed1nB y~ r . It is f i rly clea r 
that this • like other f orms of cumulat ive discounts .i a substan-
tially on the same level as t ho stra i ght-quantity discount. 
The effect of such volume di s counts i s to favor those 
firms whose aggre te purch see dur in a rsrticular period 
are ~eatest and this is truo quite par t f rom the question 
of the aver e size of the indi ~idual order, A second effect 
i s t o concentrate the puroh ees Of any one deal er upon one 
s ller,. thus a.cting in pert as an exclusive dealing arrangement. 
"A cumulative di scount i s soun only mere s vin a have been 
achieved by th e seller with respect to tndividua.l sales made to 
a p rtioular bu1er over a er1od of time. v.hioh savi ngs er~ 
not r eflected in the prioe at hioh t he buyer purobaeed and 
~hich are reserved f or the purchase of. refunding a t the end of 
a period o£ time. •19 
18 Zorn , ~ oit., p . 161. 
l 9In the matter of H.c. Britt Co. Ino. docket o. 3299{order 
issued February 10. 1938). 
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'-?. ijtt. 
~:v. 'he l m o:f dimi ni shing rotu.rns ep:plieo to quantity di s-
-~-; 
20 
counts as i does to any other co 1p- re,ble f ac tor, The a van-
t ages and disadv~~1ta es of quartity business from a single buyer 
i s inviting generally doen~ d prof i table . : 1ere a re pro-
nounoe.d s :vir1gs in cost i nvol ved. , As an illustr tion the bus-
iness o · a retailer is usuall y oonsidere unprofit blo if he 
only pure ases occasi onelly nnd in broken l ots .. On the oth r 
hand, 0. retailer mo buys Ji th roa.aonab l e regul a.ri ty . in st -
dar quanti t ies, i s a ccepted e profi table eal~ r . Usually 
the volume Vihioh a r etailer b s i n most lines of co~erce 1a 
no t required to be er.cessive i n order to reaoh a ~ ack in eff-
ici ency and lo 1 cos of handling , From that point on there is 
no appreciable sav:h1gs i n cost , tho h th adde v olume :per 
dealer has un intrins ic and someti oee i ntangi bl.o value to the 
,. 
_;_, 
ell or hioh is expressed in re ._. . , rds of 11 • 21" or 3~ addi t onal 
discounts as the vol ume increases . Such x•ev c,rds o not ordin• 
arily resul t in i njurious discriminat i on among competitors. 
On t he other hand , volume purchases L~y attai n size 
... here they beoome a disadvantage , if not de.ngei•oua o tho int ... 
erosts of the sell r . ost m ufa.oturers have a l ways sought to 
cliversi their outlets rmd to a.voi u selling too 1ar0 e a ...-.':lnre 
of t eir PJ.?O(l u.a t i on to ~· ny purchaser. To do so , was to i nvite, 
sooner or l ater , tha domirotion o:f one's business by the single 
l r ge }1Urchaaer,. Therefore • while the busine as of a reasonable 
1 
vol ume bUifer as i :nvi ti ~ and at tho s an e ti tl· d onstratod 
econol! ic sa ingiJ i n co 
• 
h£~ volume s oon r eo.c. ed ..... poin t 'l:here 
there ere no furt}ler aavi gs i n co t res :t•dloos of ho rea t 
t he volum ec me • Th t i s ,. t' e la r o dioiniahing ro turns o 
in to pl cy , ·xn .... e asau t ion that , oo .use t-.. l u.rt; q ' t i · 
pt.Irchu e i a made , greater d ll gr ee.te:r quanti y discounts be 
,.. r l:.:n ted• bu:auso as the qu~.nti ty inare ~es 1;h cost 
i n di rect ,pr opor tion. i ..:. fre quentl y f ar f ror: the f..., ts . 
1er n ... y be no en to t L f'ortm o_ q uc.>.nt i t diuoount t:~ hioh 
buo ine.3" in enui ty may d is • 1 ·: a.t v r :pl e.n may · u .:>e d , as a 
:~enern.l rul o , i ·'· a..· eo.r<:< a'"" :part o the sellar ' s l'U ' 11 h ed price 
liat .. n is deV'isod for the pur pose of EJncoura ing the c ontinued 
pa ron B0 O·f t he pUrclw.ser 02' to i ndue purchases in l ;:.lor qua.n .. 
tit iea or u ith fe er deliveries . 
On th other hand . many sellers do not is>;)u a publish d 
prioe lis t . prices . re conputed on o. d .... y to day basi s in a.ccord-
B-noe ,ith cur re t r1n r ket conditi on>;) - the co1pe :t t on ith thich 
the selljr i s f Bced , the siza . quanttty , or desi rcoili y o t he 
i !1Cdi a t oruor . 
!any s eller s lila.Y · dopt thi form of prioin ;for o cle.ss of 
custome.rc or r:urchssers and the publi shed price 11 t fo other • 
. anever t G unpublished :price listis uaed. i · opens ,.;i d tbo 
oportunity for unfair price clisorimlne.tion. I t is, ther eforo. 
about t his £or o.~ price r;taking tbe.t the Robinson-J?a tman Ac t is 
most concerned. . J:'rices are not quoted off of list. U ually th y 
a ro quoted net subject to a cash di soonnt and vary :from day to 
-
- - -
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day, or er to ord . . r . 
ile this m thod has n.lwa.,1s been us a. 1 t h s 1nore sed 
tromen oualy in recent y, s s t 1e eoncont rat·· on 1: uroh s i ng 
pot"Ter h e inol"eas d in the h s of m buyers i n tho c onaumer 
sood'J in u try, 
v. Functi onal Disc ount : 
-u.D.ntity discounts, as v-as pointed o t , are preferent i a l 
discount s to i ndi vi dual customers representin8 the ca lcul able 
economi es resulting direc t l y from the quanti t y or 1 nner 1n 
which 1nd1vi ual c"U.~tomers pllrobe.sed . Functione.l i scounta on 
t he other hand , applies to bron.d groups of customer s . I t may 
be defined a.s e. "systematic disorimination between clesaes 
of customer s r elated entirel y to differences in the respective 
roles pl yed by these classes i n t he further distribution, pro. 
ceasing. or Qonsumption of the pr oduct in questi on, vailable 
e ually to . all buyers performing identical functions, regardless 
of 1ndividu l differences in uantity or manne r of purehaae.u21 
Typical , d most pr ominent form of the functional discount 
1s tho differential gr wted. to .hol esalc;)ra for t e funct ions per• 
for med by t hem, :.1.: e vmoleanl differentia l i s f i xed di s count 
regul arly r o.nted t o .,;h olesalers of e. prOd.uot and as regularly 
denied to X' Ota i lers of that prod.uc t. 
Tho Act as approved , f ils to touch specifically on the 
legali ty of functiorutl dincou ts an a.s a result consi erable 
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confu :ton has nriscn. 
The ne ed for eeptl.rato i '-JC 1eei on of . uno·aonal dif'fe:ren-
tials fs \'l i th res eot to cert, i n oi tu tions :tn ,hich the r ting 
of s ah diffarantial a may r o ult i n i n jur y to oomp~tit1on. 11 
· nufacturer do not orB.i n" rily conpeto ,.- t h rm olesal ers , nor 
rholoselere 1! th retailers, bt t it cannot be .ssumed that dif• 
:ferentiel s bet een t hose classes o:f customers , re.nted s olely 
on e. function 1 asis t:l.nd not jur.: tifiabl e by diffol .. onea L costs . 
may not result in injury to cornpoti ton and b e nl& rf 1 . If injury 
to competiton results . t he f e.ct th t tho differentia l ·as ada 
in goo f ith on ftmct:t onal ounde· is no defense . 23 
The mos t co on sit .ti on 1n ".il ich problems are created by 
the ehen~ing of functional pr!oes o.ri ·as v.'h en sul plier distl·i-
butee thr ou ... h bot h wholes le rs an reta ilers in the s. o sales 
ar ea . The seller has no control over the goods e,fter t hey a re 
purchased, 
A whol ese.le r may a t a:ny t i 1e operate a ret il storo end 
en a ,e in oompetiton vdth the retailers sol direct . If he doea 
so, he beco'l!l.ea to t hat e t en t , a reta ile:r and h i s · holes l e di :f ... 
ferenti al ives him a co_. e t i t 1ve advantage a:.ad beoor. es an un-
l avr.f'ul disoriminat i n. Si milar l y , if a reta iler oraanizes 
wholly owned holes le subsidiar y for t e purpose i n ~ole or 
i n rt of s u:ppl yin hi s own retail s tores , unl a;vful di scrimin-
a t i on may res lt i f the supplier sells a t his ~olesale prio 
24:: 
to t ho subsi ia.ry. It follows t hat where a. supplior s el ls a t 
22Austin . O'!'> t oi .;_. • :p ., 51 ., 
23 . 
I bi d•• P• 51. 
24I b1d., P• 51. 
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iffert;)ut pricos to c·· f o:t~ nt · p - c'-8.se ~j - ho r: · :~ be • or ec ome 
lin . elt infol ..ued c. s to t 1 true nature 
ant oo . e of t e bunine ., c.o t lvi ties of hi s . ototiers ii' he 
•;ould avoid violati on of the Robinson- l?atman c · • 
oustomer -,-mo r esells i ;rh ole or in part at r tE'.i l but 
·;tho buys and distrib tos as a fholesaler y p-.to... J:•l r b gre.nted 
n functi onal diff renti~l on the goo a resold a · :tot. l -tl:ffi-
cient t o oomponsat hit for hi r. aost of distribution. . o ain 
re ailer who mainta ins a t7arehouse • ta a quantity doli varies 
there and tre.n :t;)ort .. tbe goods to his v rious retail outlet 1~; 
his own oonveyuncea or at h!s OVTn a: ense , may be gr o. t " a price 
loner than that charge to the retailers taking storo d.oor del-
25 ivory. ·ucll e. dif e:rential ro.e.y be justified to the e~tent of 
the cha in*s ratailars ooots of .. areholsinno and deliv ry h :loh 
are l10t inourra by othor r t , ilOl"S• ~ho.t is , th " dif erenti 1 
does no r esul t iu injury to ooi:.JX;lt i ·ton if it ooe not give the 
r et ilor p yin. the lo ·,er prio o.n advantage in coo of the goods 
l a id m·m at t he plac of resale • 
;..:tus , f au plier .-ho chooses to eng ·ge in a du.l tho of 
distribution in t he arune ter ritory t kea the Iiv . t ut his funo• 
tional i s oounts may become unle ·r.fUl priao cliaori--ina io:1.s s a 
ro""ul t of cond itions ov r whi ch he has no control . 26 He .. ssu.ces 
the burden of eepi ng himself informed at ~11 ti a , not only 
as to \bother hi s wholesv.l - custom rs <-~e reselling at retail, 
but lao to the prices at hioh they resell at 1i'holesale • 
26 ustin, o .2.!1.!.. :P• 53:e 
26Ibid •• P• 64t 
If functional differentials are employed, and if they 
are based upon a bona. fide olassifioa.tion of ouetomere e.t 
non-competitive levels and are not used to injure the sup-
plier•s competitors, they will not result in unl ''' ful dis-
' j·. 
crimina.tions unless used by the recipients of e. lower price 
to create a. competitive advantage. at a lower level of comp-
etition either for themselves or tor their customers. 27 
Conclusion ... 
It may be concluded tha t funotiorml discounts or diff-
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erentiale, as such, are not prohibited by the Aot. Thi s con-
clusion is purely ne gative and comes with it no implied en-
dorsement of the legal! ty of any apeci fie ey stem of functional 
discounts followed by any individual seller. In each case. it 
Vlill not be the principle but the exact manner of 1 ts a.ppli ... 
cation tb.at is likely to constitute the issue and to determine 
the boundary bet,veen permissible and illega.l practices. 
Consequently, it will be necessary for eaoh s eller to 
examine discount policy to see if it conforms th the prin-
28 
ciples established by the Act. lie will he.ve to consider his 
system of customer qlaeeif ioation carefully to determine whe ther 
it is OOXlsistent and likely to stand the test of "reasonableness". 
Functional discounts which oan be shown t9 have an injurious 
effect on oompe t i ton or on oompett tors of the favored buyer ill 
27Austin, .2.:£.t_ ait,, P• 54, 
28 Zorn, ~ ~. p, 174. 
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be held unreasonable end i mproper ., !~hera no such effect can 
clearly be shown to flow directly, it i s highly unlikely that 
29 t he courts \·ill interfere. 
VI 4 Brokerase Paxmenta • 
(a) The chain store investigation conducted from 1928 
to 1934 by the Federal Trade Commission shoVIed that large 
cooperate buyers secured discriminatory low prices not only 
on the pretense of quantity discounts., but also by getting 
30 
rebates for brokerage aerv~ces. The payment of brokerage 
by a seller to a buyer. or agent of the buyer. was not induced 
because of any brokerage service rendered by the .buyers to the 
seller. but r ather because of the buying club in the ho.nd of 
th ose '\'7hO controlled l arge volum pUl"ohaaes i . iVhich they wielded 
in dem~nding for themselves unwarranted price concessions in 
various forms Sellers had become power less to offset and resi s t 
t hese demands. In order to protect the sellers and the public. 
it was necessary to prohibit by · l a the ··false pa3ment of brok-
erage l 
fair pric 
;,··i th the prohibition of auoh other methode of un-
on ssions as were disclosed 1n the invest! ation. 
Section 2 Co) of the Act was enacted to remedy this s i t -
uation and provides t hat; 
It shall be unlawful for a.ny person engaged in commerce 
to pay, or grant, or receive, or accept, any thing of value as 
a commission, a brokerage of other oo.mpens.a t ion o:f an allow ... 
e.noe or discount in lieu thereof • e::g:oept for services rendered 
29zorn • ..2E.t. cit, .• P• 174. 
30Jrederal Trade .Oommi>:>sion. ]linal Re port On Th.e Chain Store 
Investigat ion , 74th Congress, let Session, Senate-Document No. 34, l935, p . 55. 
in connection n~th th sale or pu:rchas o· . ooda, V~ares, 
or meroba.ndiae. l All such nllo' ancea are prohi b1 t ed, as 
such, except tor services rendered, regardle ss of t heir 
effeot upon competition. 
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i he l an ua e whioh crea tes rea l diff iculty ia nexoept 
for service a r endered". 11 thout the inol usi on of t hese mrda , 
t he section woUld have prohibi t ed any payment of brokerage 
to a buyer o:r to someone aubjeot to his control. or to ·. sel ler , 
It would not appl y to brokerage transactions enerally. 
The most adequate 1nter:pret~~t1on of t he phr s , of iih!ch there 
are mo.ny , ie that it ·:ould permit t he payment o brokera _,e to 
a buyer or a buyer ' s a.gant or subs i di ary if so e service :rere 
e.otually rendered to the s eller, provided th.t the amount of 
brokerage ttas directly r el a ted to the v aluo of suoh ser Vices 
. 32 to the seller. I o roka r age l l.o ;ance or i s coun in lieu 
thereof paid to a buyer or a buyer* s a ent could exoe the 
fair value of t he service performed • for i f 1 t di d• 1 t 10uld 
undoubtedly be considered as a price d1aorim1n.:.t ion wi thi n the 
mea.11ing of subsection 2 ( a. ) • 
Brokers o, or c ommi ssion ·t a a cost ale nt include in t he 
selling prioe to reimburse tho selle r for the cost o:f :performing 
the brokerage or personal selling fUnction. 33 1'hat i s th nee ... 
essat"y functiOll of bring ing the aoods to the attention of the 
buyer or t he bu.yer •s agant. If it re possible i n the ordinary 
31Houae of Representatives Act l~o. 692t 74th CoDgress. 
32John ller , Unfair Com;Eetition (Oambridgez Harvard Univ. 
Freas, 1941). P• 152. -
33 Patman, ~ oJ t, ., P• 103. 
course o:f bttsin~ss to sell merchandise w1 t .hout the soller 
ent ering upon tho per£ormance of this £Unction, no purpose 
liJOUld be served i n settling up in the selling price; a cost 
f actor to cover the brokerage cost. The sales price of t he 
aver age seller would be reduced by t he amount of the other-
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i se anticipated cost of the f unction. On the other hand, if 
no cost factor for brokerage or commission 1a included in the 
selling price, then the ellowance of a brokerage or commission 
to the purohaser represents an outright price concession. It 
. 34 
must be treated as a prioe discrimination in fact. 
All practical experience has mom. that the chief res-
ponsibility for the movement of goods rests upon the shoulders 
of the owner Of the goods. Therefore, it is the universal pr o-
tice for the seller to include the complete oost of eellin his 
goods in the selling price of these goods• It is a point in law, 
" S 1ell as in morals, that a man oe.nnot serve two masters. 35 
The Robinson-Fatman Aot has simply re.1ntoroed this legal concept 
of the relat1onsh1p .between an agent and his principal by m king 
it unlawful tor a seller to pay brokerage to a buyer or agent 
of the buyer. 
The true broker serves either e.s a representative of the 
seller or as the representative of the buyer.36 It is ethically 
and impossible for him to serve the best interests of both the 
34Pa tma.n, ~ pitt • P• 103, 
35Ibidt,• P• 104. 
36 
. Ibid • • P• 103. 
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buyer antl the ael la:r in t e sam· transa.oti on. If he is employed 
by the seller to fi nd profitable market outlets for his :products. 
he io expected to rendor certain distinct services to the seller 
3'1 
on behalf of the sale of his goods·., This usually requires t hat 
he spend a reasonable amount of tirna, effort, and perhaps money 
in a search for buyers in a free and open market. 
On the other hand• he may be employed by a buyer.38 His 
duties are then to find sources of supply for the buyer 1hioh 
usually involves an expenditure of effort, time and money in 
search of s ources of s upply on behalf of the buyer. t hile in 
certain phases of oommeroe the interests of a buyer and seller 
may be identical. the mutual rela tionship of a manufacturer or 
t holesa.ler and his retail ous tomer are direotly opposed. The 
buyer seeka merchandise of the highest quality at the lo est 
price. The seller seeks to obtain the highest possible price 
foX' his pr oducts. 'llhe opposition of ·interests constitutes · t he 
heart of free and open competiton, 
When both fail to func t ion they do so either a.s the result 
of 111-.advised inertia on the part of buyer or seller, or because 
of c ollusion on the part of t he broker who ostensibly is reQ ... 
eiving payment f:rom -one party but is ac t ually in the employ of 
39 t he other party. 
ss distributors,. however, negotiate directly rlth the 
40 
:producer, without the intervention of t he broker. In muny 
3'1 J.>atman, .5U!.!, oit, , p, 103, 
38Ibid. t Pt . 103 , , 
. ' ·.~~ . 39
zorn, .!U!.!. citf •. P• 2o5,. 
cases . the l a rg chains have s ought to indue the a ller to 
pay the buyer the feo tha t he 1ould otherwise· have pa id the 
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- bro~r or. give hi m a discount of ec1ui'va lent mount . some-
times th:ls i s done directly, toon a.gain it ay be done thro h 
a dummy brokerage firm ovned and acting in behalf of the buyer. 
Clearly the payment of broY~rage to a buyer or representa tive 
of a buyer might be used as un indirect fo of prioe .diacrim-
in.,... t ion. But as suoh and in ci r oumstanaes v.1h re 1 t mi ght injure 
or lessen competition it is unlawfule under Section 2 { ). 
~e brokerage Section of 2 (o) goes far beyond a mere prohib-
ition of t he pr actice of pay1n"" brokerage fees to a Principal 
to a t r ansaction; directly or iridir~J;tly through an i nte r mediary 
4 :f 
sating on behalf of the principal. '~ Such pra.ct1ces were pre-
sari bed by Congress in the O·ommissi on • s view • not me rely because 
they involve prioe discrimination but beoaus Con ess considered 
them to be inherently unfair methods of oompeti tion whi ch a re 
in th ms.elves injur iona to commerce,. Payments of brokerage by 
one principal to another directly or through an intermedi ary are 
al rnys illegal. ~hie ia ao wheth r or not there ia any effect to 
injure or lessen oompet1t on or to create a monopoly. l-; or i s 1 t 
t:~. (le:fense to show that because the seller sa.ved thE;J brokers. e fee 
t he brokera. . e paid. makes only due aJ.lo.anoe for differences in 
t he coat of elling.; These d fenaes , \illoh may be pleaded under 
Section 2 {a) aro hel d b1 the commi ssion to be inapplio~ble to 
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~action 2 {c). 41 The bro1m~aee secti o~ of the ct hus been 
t he occasi on of several orders anc court appeal s .. The proceedings 
a.n·a i n.s t the Great Atlo.nti o And Paci f ic mea Company , . hi ch ll 
be discussed in the ne t ch pt r, provided the occs~ion f or t he 
O.;} t exhaustive discussion of the meaining of the l a. • It is 
di£ficult to ·peculate upon t he ultimate effect of the brorerage 
provi s ions . Ins of r as 1 t tends to p:reven.t treat ment of J:e.rtic. 
ular groups, the Section a:ppeers likely t o change t he bal ance 
of competitive e.dva.nta e between various rival channels of dis-
tribution. I t may l ead t~ a complete re.examination of discount 
schedules, and in t he process of recla.ssifyin . · customers • 1 t 
may be tha t tho e f orme rly :teceivin brokerage vlill become t he 
recipients of price commi ssions or discounts l egal under t he cost 
proviso of Section 2 (a ). 
CHAFT..i!.L~ V 
In the previoua ahaptera. v;e have discussed the origin 
and background o:f the Robinson*Patman Act ani what we mean 
by quantity discounts. In this ohepter, t he author Will pre-
serlt actue.l court cases which will concr~tely illustrate the 
quantity dieooun.t and ita disori. m1na.t1ng use. 
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Section 2 (a) of the Robinson.Patma.n Aot, 1e have seen.1 
makes 1 t unlawful to discriminate i n price, but perm! ta a 
respondent to show that his price differences based upon dif-
ferences in quantities sold, makes only due llo1a.nce for the 
differences in cost of manufacture , sale or delivery. Since 
1936 , the Commission has b·rought a.oti on against numerous firma 
under this Section. and 1 t appears that definite progress is 
being me.de i n correotin the unfair prf.wti ce of exoessi ve quan-
t ity discounts. 
mhe leadin court case, which has been decided on disorim• 
inetory low prices based upon quantity buying is the " orton 
Salt Oa.se v, Federal Trade Commtsaion·; 2 argued on rch 10, 1948 
and decided on Yay z. 1948. This case irivolv d the use of cum .. 
ulat ive quantity discounts given on t he basis of a purchaser's 
actual prospective purchases during a period of one year. 3 
Hi storic 1 Background • 
~e orton s lt Company is an Illinois oorpo~ation produ-
oing1 manufa.c t u.::ring , and selling salt in interstate commerce 
l see Chapter IV of this thesis. 
~orton Salt co. v. F.~ .• a. 162 F. (2d) 149, 1947. 
3vernon und. Government and Buaineas,(N.Y.: Harp· r & Bros., 
1950), p . 347. ---
r 
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1n all parts of tho Un1 ted States to · holeeeler"'• retailers. 
and oonsumera.4 It is one of the lar eat pr ucera and d1st-
r1buters of this product in the country. ~able salt ia the 
only product i nvolved in this proc eeding. 
1he record in t he orton Salt Caaa sho d that respondent 
sold 1 ts Blue Label· ~alt to both wb. olosalers and retailers at 
zona- deli voxoed pr1ae on the follm·11 discount basis: 5 
Per Oa.se 
- ---.-..-
Lesa.than•c r load purchases 
Carload purchase (a pro • 1036 cnse n ) 
5000 case purchases in any oonse.eutive 
'12 montba · 
50.,000 o a purohe.aee in e.nj coneeouti ve 
12 months 
1.60 
'1.50 
Only five companies. the ertcan Stores Company . the 
1 ational nea Company , t he Kr er Grocery Comp ny • t he Safewe.y 
utores, Inc., and the Grea t Atlantic and Pacific Te Company 
had ever bou ,ht .sufficient quantities of th is eeJ.t to obtain 
the ~ 1.36 per oase priett. These compani es could buy in aueh 
quanti ties bee usa tooy operat . larr,e . c · ins of ret!~.il atoree 
in various parts of the oountr • 
As result of this lo'l price. t se five co pa.ni es have 
been. able to sell th s · lUG La. el S l t a t rat,~!l e ;~aper 
than wholesale producers f~orn r s pond nt coUld reasonably sell 
tha same brood of salt to 1 < e:pendently o rated r tail stores, 
m ny . of hom oompeted with the lOoal. outlet~ of the. :fiv chain 
stores .• 
4uni ted States Re;eort. Vol. 334• October term 1947. 
5 Ib1dtt P• 41. 
, 
The Cl'ttft-~ 1 
-AIU4!.L as · on .D 
+0UlJ.d t.bs 
to the ohai t the Pl"ioe . 
b stores oonstitnt - di:fforanttal 
that 1 ta e:tteot d a diao:rimtnati ranted 
. was to in" - - on in Pl"i 
tail · - .Jllre oompa t.ft , oe, and e~a and tho on uet~e 
Chains. l t ala . en the small 
.failed to ah . . o f ound that th . re-
ow that the di if . ..e respondent had difte~n~es in coat or 0Qde i~enoee i n Price ere just1tled by 
lo me.; · · g'OOd ia1 th to ~"oct ot a oornnet"t 6 . - meet an eqUall ~ 4_or. 3 
The Morton Salt Oom~.ny;s 
stendnrd qnanti ty i s oount s , 
basic oontent1o . 
_:n was that 1 ts 
aVaJ.lsbl e to a ll o.n 
as oontraeted for exam le• to hidden - eq~aJ. tel"ms, 
or speoial rebates or 
ciiacountat are not di Qr1 mina*or; wi th in the . . 
- meani.t~g o:f the 
Act. 
The oompa.ny ca.rried t he Cormniesion•s cease and desist 
order to the court of appeals, and on ·a, 27• 1947 the court 
d1reote4 t h a t the Co1DJ'!dssion's order be dismissed.? Th :teupon 
the Co=mtseion appealed the oase to the Supreme Court. 
In a oa.re:f'ully prepa red opinion, Justice Bl aok. speaking 
:tor the Court • found that the quantity discounts were. in faot, 
discriminatory and illegal UDder Seeti on 2 (a) • According to 
Justice Blaak, 
"Theore·tioa.lly. these di sco~nts are equally available to 
all, but functionally they are not . For as the record indicates 
- - - no single i ndependent reta il grooer y store. and probably 
no single wholesaler. bOUght as meny aa 60.000 casas or as 
much as 60,000 worth ot table salt .in one year. The le is• . 
l sti ve history of the 1obineon- J2a an at me.ko s it aubndantly 
olear that Congress considered it to be an evil that a large 
buyer could secure a oompeti t ivo advantage over o a all buyer 
0Urii t ed States Report• .2:e.r. ·cit,, p, 41. 
7Morton Salt co. • .9.:E.s, cit • • • 
sol ely because of tho l ar bu.yer' .s qu.a.ntity puroha.sinac 
ability. The Robinson-Pa nn Aot 786 passed to depr ive a 
large buyer of such advantages a~o pt to he extant that 
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a l o er :price could be justified by reason of a seller ' s 
diminished coat due to quantity manufaotur ·, d livery or 
sale, or by reason of the seller's §ood faith effort to eet 
a co mpe titor's equally lo price . " 
~e Company also ar ;,ued that its quantity di count 
aohJdul e had not, in fact, oaua d injury t o competition, 
Justioo Bl s.ok, however. re) liad that the Rob:.trson- Fatman 
Act, does not require actual injury • In his words: 
"~be statute requires no more than the effeot of the 
prohi bited price di crimina tion may be substantially to 
lessen c.ompetition or to injure , d<h .. troy, or prevent comp-
etition. n 
After a. careful consideration of this provision of 
the obinson- . tma.n -Act , a have said t hat "the st tuta 
does not require that ~ e discriminations must i n f act 
have harmed competi ti on, but only that there is a reason-
able possibility thnt "they" e.y 11avo an effect, " Cor 
Products Oo. v. F. T .• c, 324 v . 72611 742. Here t he Commission 
f ound •hat would ppear to be obvious , t hat the competitive 
oppor tunities of certa in erchants were injured ~hen they 
had to pay respond$nt substantially more for their goods 
~han the ir conpeti t ors had to pay. The f indings a e .adequate . 9 
The iorton Sal t Company ar gued that lass t h n carload 
sales o.re very s e,l l in compar ison tl th the tot al vo~ume of 
its busine ss an fort at re · son should reject the o isaion's 
:findings that tb.e effect of t he ca;rloa iscri:rr ina.ti on may 
8F.T. c . v. 1orton Salt Co., 334, U. s . 37 1 42-43 (1948). 
9 . 6 Ibid. , J?- 4 • 
subst.an"t i e.lly lassen oomp-tition and. !i y i njur competit ion 
bat een purchasers o are )ranted and those who o.re denied 
thi .... disorirainat :t en d1soount . 10 To suppo.t.~t th1 are;u.u nt • 
refor enc is made to tlle f'aot that o;;> t i s a 1 i tem i n 
most Wholeoale and retail business and i n consumers budgets. 
The l:'edere.l Tr ade Commissi on r ejected .1 is pl ea by 
atatin., t hnt there are many articles in a f$r ooer9 store , 
consi dered separately , a.ra oornv ra.ti vely smull p r ts o:f a. 
mer ehe.nts stock. Congress int nded o protect a 1oro ant 
from competitive in~ury attributable to aioorimiu tory prices 
on any or tJl l good pOl in i nter t ate co erce , v,rh t er t he 
par 1cul ar goods consti tutod a m · ·or or minor oz·tion of his 
otoclt. Si nce a 0 rocory s tore conaints o:t many oompa.ru.t i vely 
sm. 1 ::lr tiol as . there if? no possible " y effect ively to pr o-
tect a gr ocer fro m di soriminnto1·y 11rioee except ,by ap l ying 
tho prohibi tiona of the Aot to e ,oh i , ' · vi dual articl e in 
the store . 
Congres in o otinc: the nobinson- l? an Act 'las espe ... 
cisll y conoel:nod ~ Ji th pr otooti £:!' . • all busine eooa 1h • c h ere 
uno.bl · to buy in quo.n ti t ioa such a ... the .P Loha ·ea of c r loa.d 
lots. 
Cha !ortor1 ~:jalt Cot:p ny m~ · ntail1od that the vi one i a 
inad quate ·o su:ppo:t; th Com ... rnissi on *s findi ng ... o in· , y to 
o mr..etitio:n., On the oth r h d • t h Co ission i s ..... ut.tor1zed 
10.,." m C t 
,i! . ..... v • .w.or on 
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by t he ot to bar diaorim· na.tory prices upon "the Reas onable 
posai bil1 ty" that di fferent prices f or lilto. rtoo a t o o ompeting 
ll purchasers may have the defined effect on oom·etition. The 
quantity discounts did r esult in J)rioe differentials between 
compe tinB purchasers suf f icient to influence th 1r resale price 
and ,as sho .n by evidence. ~his evidenoe , which c cnsista of 
testimony f rom various part s of the country , covers about 2 ,000 
12 peges nd largely devoted to one aspect .. injury to oompetiton. 
Thi s evidence veri:ti es and just!. ies the Commission •s f inding 
of i njury to c .. pe tition. 
The Commissi on found that t he Morton Salt Company had been 
cont inuousl y en aged i n dieorimination actions through. t he use 
of discounts, rebates, and aJ.lov.ra.noE}s . I t had further f ound 
that they had failed to sh~ justifi cation for these differences 
by reason of a corrospondin difference in its cost. 
Thus, t he rest rQints i mposed by t he Commi ssion upon the 
.~or ton Salt Conp n;y a:ro eoncernQd rri th the precise unlawful 
p:ra.ctioes · 1n vh1oh 1 t was f ound to have en aged for a number 
of years. 
Qne of the reasons f or entrustin enf rcement of this Aot 
primar.il y t o the Commissi on, a body of experts, was to authorize 
it t o beer evidence as to iven ditferential pr actices and to 
13 
make findin s co noernin possible injury t o oompeti ti on. Suoh 
findings are to f orm the basis for cease and desist orders de:t ... 
11see Chapter III of t hi s thesi s. 
1 2 
· . T •• v , :Morton Sc.lt Co., OD. cit ,. 
ini t ly restrui n0 the p1rtioular d i s c:rim' ato1: pr .cticos 
~.m.ich may tencl to in ·ur c ompo tit ion -rri thout j ti "' i c ti on. 
""he e:f:f.ecti ve admi j,1i tra.t.i on of 'tho ot, inoof'ar as 
the .. ct entrusts edninistra.tio:n to the Comrnission, 1UOul<l be 
gre tly ~IiliJ red . i ·d. thou.t CO!!ip llin rc ~ouo . tho Co ni -
ssion•s ceaso and deciot orders did no ~or than hift o the 
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courto in 3 bs quont c ter.1pt oceediug.e for thei r viol ations 
the very fact ue sti one of inj ry o om i · i n. mi ch the 
Act r quires th Commdas1on to d t rmine a.a ~h b ·is for ita 
.ordor. 
In conclusion o thi s case , quant1 ·y curload•lot dis-
counts by this unufac t urer, altho h r l ated by substantial 
evidence to the ea t of the sal and delivery of tho pr oduots 
r-sultin from tho difforent methods of handling a carload 
quantity buyer from he method of han line; snnller quanti t ies 
ere held to be n violation of the Hobina.on•Patman Act . 
otwi thstnnding , t e price differan iale ere dete tned 
sol ly by tho quanti ty of the products pul-ohBsed nd ere a 
relatively smell part of the sellin price and the discounts 
ere available to all on equal term , here t hey ave the large 
buyer a. compe ti t1v 
illegal under the 
advant age over th small buyer • ..~; i .s as 
obinson-Patman Aot amend nt, save, aa they 
came within the exoe.pti ons by the statute in instances .1he:re 
the di s count fairly reflected oost savir.~ga to the seller or 
we.s a ood f a.1 th effort to me~t s oompeti to:r's equally low price. 
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Upon the basi a o:f the Uorton S&l. t Oase • the rule appears 
to be firmly established that henceforth sellers must be pr e• 
pared to ~uatify· their :q.uantity diaoOUtlta by showing actual 
oost aav1ngs.14 Ooa a.al~untillg sys tems Will .need to be main .. 
- ~~~~ 
t a.ined to seoure o. reasonable estimate of the savings \Vhioh 
accrue 1n quantity sales. in packing, sh ipping• or in clerica l 
&%Pense, manufacturing and. selling. 
The Great Atlantic And. Paoifig Tea Oeae • 
t.rhe Great Atlantic And Faoific Tea OompB.lly is a l a.r e 
con cern w1 th approxime.tely 6,000 etores h!ch in 1947 did a 
retail business of t wo billion dollara,15 It accounts for 7 
of the national. retail sales and some 43% of the total ea.J.ea of 
the f ive largest grocery ohains.16 
This company first came into existence in 1859 as the 
Grea t American Tea Company in ~attan.17 TC!ta \.1ae brirJ8ing 
in a dollar a pound. By buying it off the ship and eliminating 
th e middleman , George Hartford and George Gilman thought t hey 
could sell 1 t for thirty oen ta a plmd. Through ehrewd meroha.n-
dis1ng teohiqUet:J and all the gl itter and tineel Of e. oiroua, 
the company spr ead, On the p;ro:t!ts, the oo:rnpaey grew and opened 
neVI atOl'es 1n surrounding town.,. sta rted wagon routes to sell 
tea and spices to fann dves. and oha.nged the name of the comp-
any to the Grea t Atlantic and Paoifio Tea. Oompa.ny. By 1880, the 
oha.in had 100 stores. Partner Gilman sold out and :retired on his 
profits. 
14 und, op,oit., P• 349. 
1 6Raah1 Fein. Quarterly Journal of Economi cs, ote on Price 
·Discrimination And The A & P Case, Vol. LXV. No. 2, May 1951. 
16Ibid., P• 271. 
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In 1912. George Hartfor d and hia sons John and Geor e, 
s pot t EJd a new trend and pro posed a c ash a nd c arry "economy 
store" run by one 11'6n1 operati ng at the lowest possible profit 
and shootinR' fo r b i g volume. 
• The Hartforde opened the f irst such store without giving 
it any :name 1n a di ngy bUilding not ~ar from A&P's most prof-
iftable .at or$ in Jdraey Cit;. In ei_x: months, the ·obscure 11 ttle 
store drove the b1.gger st-ore out of bUsiMss., 
~hey now de.oided to sta rt eoonqny stores tar and wide. 
Operating on a simple formula, 1000 tor working oa:pital, 1000 
tor eqUipment, the oompa.ny opened 1600 stores in the period of 
t wo years e.t the r ate of about t hree eve.ry working daJ• 
A&P's growth was just be1nning, the Hartford brothers 
decided they could sell even oheaper by making still more of 
their own goode. 
A&l? became 1 ts own oanne·r pe.cking muoh of the tinned goode 
1 t sella under l abels such as SUltana, I one., and SUllllybrook. 
A&12's meats a re purchased and a ssemb led by one of 1 te many sub· 
sidiaries,. lqa ti onal Meat s• Its X~a.t1 onal Bakery Division is the 
oount,.-y'ts l ar gest baking operation, smaller Only than Continental. 
One hundred and for ty million dOllars worth of Jane Parker pie, 
19 
oake and bread is t aken out of A&P'e ovens eaoh year. 
A&p'a American Coffee Oe>rp. is the world's largest f'e.otor 
in the oo:f'fee business. roasting and selling 140,000 tone of 
17!Cime U&gazine, !!! Oirole .and Gold Leaf, .Nov. 13 , 1960,p.90. 
l8Ibid._, p. 92 • 
. #~Anthony Moree, A & l? Case. 1960~, P• 11. submitted for 
. B.A. at Boston University. 
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coffee annually •. A & :P 's Quaker Mai d i s a hug producer of 
ba.kin .. ~ powder •. may onna.isee, beans eta. Quaker Maidts . sub-
sidiaries paolm ~hite House evaporated m1lk,Ann Pa e preserves 
A 20 
and ~allies are etill another A&P business of great s1f e• 
. ; ~ 
he Atlantic Commission Co. purchases t hrough 1 ts seventy 
field offices over 2,ooo,ooo tons of fre$b fl"U1t and Tegetabl e s 
each yao:r. Oonne«:ted vi th the e Yo:rk headquarters by 9300 miles 
of teletype, t he ACCO men are in s ine for the potato orop , in 
Michigan when cherries are ripe, and in Texas when the o*ions 
21 
are ready. 
By 1926. - they had 13,961 stores and sales of 43'1 million 
dollars. 22 They now decentralized by splitting A&P into seven 
regiona.l retail divisions, each run· rith central directives 
f:rom the main headquarter • They leased new s t ores instead of 
buying them, devising a. one year lease vrith nine yearly opt ions 
:tor renewal. By kee ping close watch on A&i •s finances t hey ere 
' 
able to batten down t he hatohee long before· the 1929 storm broke. 
\'hen supermarkets sprang up in the enrly thirties • the Hart-
fords opened supermarkets· and added pre-paokaged meats and pro-
duce• \Veighed and price ta.ggea. ~ey expanded by contracting. 
Ea.oh new supermarket ol.osed some six of the old type store. The 
nUD.lber of stores dwindled :trom the 1930•a. peak of 16-.'137 to today' S 
&,ooo. Yet they built so muoh mt)re volume that se.l~e 11 payrolls 
and employees rose higher t han betore. Th~e bigness in production 
and. plU'Ohaeing is nearly t wice that Of ita nearea~ oompet1 t or. 
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Safewar (1.2 billion) and nearly three times as much as Kroger 
( $825 millio:pJ, the third lfll"gest grocery chain i.n. point of 
. 23 
size. 
Anti-Trust Action ... 
As early aa 1930 11 resentment continued to grow aga inst the 
A&'i. In June .of 1932 .• the I~ati onal Asaocia tion of retail grocers 
passed a resolution to appropriate money in a fight to prove A&P 
was monopolisti<h 24 In 1938 Representative Patman made a tour of 
t he country making speeches in favor of his bill to limit the num .. 
bar of chain storea through a discriminatory tax and other regu-
lations and in general deno1moed all large chains. He attacked the 
size of A&l? and said it wa.a wrong for tha tremendous :pro£1 ts to 
go to a }81r of childless b r others. 25 Dlll'ing this period A&P hinted 
. tH.' if the l?atman Bill went througb(f. t he company would turn most of 
~~ 1 
their stores into voluntary non-taxable chains. · Each store was to 
be given to its manager on a lease or agenoy basis and A&l? would 
hamle all the wholesaling function; but in 1940 as a result of 
Con ressional hearings and adverae public sentiment toward the 
aotiv1t1es of Representat ive Patman, the bill he had uritten died 
in oommittee~ But the anti-chain foroes were ready for the next 
I 
round Blld the pressure was not ·let · up. 
In 1942, the gove:rnment announced that they had filed a 
orirninal suit against t he A&P in the u. s . Distrlot Court of the 
2~· . 
· "".Morse• ,op.oit., p •. 13. 
24
"Grooers oall A&P a monopolJ" 1 Business .Week, June 22.1932,p.B 25 . . . . 
Speeoh before the National Association of Retail Druggists, 
Vital SP!eohe!h Vol. 6,. !lov. 161 l938a pp. 69-'12. 
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Eastern Distri ct of I llinoi &t Denvill e . 
The oas uas tried before F dera l Judge ~·'alter c. Li ndley 
and A&P 1as fou.nd guilty on Sept. 21, 1946 of violati ng section 
1 & 2 of the Sherman Anti-~Tust La •26 Evidence as found that 
A&P , time and time again s old belO\ oost to beat dovm rivals in 
:prioe wars or to gai n volume by swi tobin profi ta from its non-
re t ail eubsidie.ries to stores tha.t l.·ost money •. A&:P 4eo.1ded to 
appeal the decision and the case- went to the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeal s 1n Chicago. 
~en the presiding judge, She rman Mlnton banded do ·r,n a 
decision against A&P• t he company decided not to carry their 
appe al any fur th er and }:Si d e. fine of ''175~000 on li'ebl'lle.ry 24. 
1949. 27 
But the Department of Just1oG did not feel t hat this con-
vi ction ~a.e enough, and 1t was t heir contention that A&l? would 
go right on with the pro.otioea. 'berefore they filed a o1v11 
action complaint against A&"2 in the United St a tes District Court 
28 
of !ie York on Septombe:t 16• 1949• 
The government has the privelege of t~ying a compa~ twice 
under the henna.n AOtt first to penali z • and t hen to t ake action 
to cause the oompa.ny to cease and desist 1 te :praotio·es • 
The present compl aint g•inst t he &i liete five ~or 
oounte hioh are divided into thir t y one apeci:tio. 1tetns.29 In 
26 Uw s. v• Grf.lat A• & Pt , 67 Fed.- Supp• 626• 
27u. s ~ v. Great 'A• & l'.·. 7th Citou1t Court of Appeals l o.9221. 
28u. s. v. Grea.t A. & ~ •• oomplaint in u.s. Di strict Court 
of u.Y. Civil Action No. 52-139• 
29Fe1n, 91• oit •• P• 271~ 
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essence t he government s oa se aga i ns t t he A&P is based upon 
A&P ' s selling and buying policy. 30 The A&P is a conoe.rn which 
oan and does produce many of the thi»gs it sells. It i s t heref ore 
in a poal.tion where its "requests" .to its suppliers have a oompul"' 
si~e power. On o~oaaion the A&P -. on threa t simply of not buying 
a commodity or o:f producing it itself, bas forced the producer of 
to 
the oamn.odi ty to lower its price/the .::~P.below t hat previously 
charged the A&P and ita competitors. 
The government states: 
"•·· t hat A&P not only benefits by the discriminatory 
purchase prtoe, but the supplier giving the pr eference must ohar ge 
A&:P t-e retail competitor a p r ice sufficiently higher than would 
otherwise be t he case, to · absor~1the loss or reduction in profit incident to his s ales to A&P. " · 
Thus, the government view 1e t hat, when the price is lowered 
to the A&P. lt is raised to A&P is competitors. 
~e government also Dfl; intatns t hat A&P has been convicted of 
a d•llberate calculated aoheme.i;ibnct ived 1n 1926 and carried on 
~,-,. . 
for over t wenty years, to expand ita cont rol of t he retsil grocery 
market at the expense of t h.e competitors and the consuming public, 
by boycotts. bl aok•listing • price wars, threa ts, and other ruth-
less devices. r a t her t han by utilizing more eff ioi$nt ~d economic 
meth ods of distribution. By these means, A.&P baa des tr.oyed thou-
sands of stnaJ.l businessmen, 1 t has fo reed manuf&oturera . :farmers, 
and A&P oompeti t ors in the grocery business to PlY A&P tribute, 
and the whole cost of t his vicious progr am has been passed on to 
. . 32 th& c onsuming public. · 
30a,1v1.l Action l~ o. 62•l3~t filed September 15 , 1949 in the 
u. s •. Di strict ourt for . t he Southern Di strict of .· ew York , PP• 11-16. 
31 Ibid• . . 
32congresa1onal Record, proceedings and Debates ot the Slat 
Congress .• let session .• October 6, 1949, p.2 •. 
'15 
. :i'he economto theory of tbe prosecution and 1 ta i mplied eoono ... 
mio :policy 'are best explored in 1;.ela ti on to t h e business a thode 
of tba A&P 1n ( 1) S$ll1ng gooda ·f~) 1ntegra t1 on of manufacturing 
~d reta iling • ( 3) and . buytng. 33~;1; . 
A & P Selltu ,Eolio.l • 
A&i gains retail Volume by selling below oost 1n oertain of 
its stores ana. raising its Prtoes in others ot ita stores, to 
reooup tho losses, By this Ullholy and Vicious prooess A&P des-
troyed hund.reds of amall indepelldent businessmen. 
~e government m tntains that by lowering the ,ross prof! t 
r ate in order to induce greater VOlUJae; A&P was "selling below 
ooat" and unfairly burdening oompet1t1on.34 
In th~ words at the government bri.e:t1 35 
In spee.ld.ng of ho meat business boreaeed from t o hundrtid 
to twelve hundred 4ollars per store, John Hartford pointed out. 
* "This was a.ooo!Dplished by reducing the gross profit rate until the 
volume was bUilt up to a point where the expense rate was 101 
,, 
enough to operate the store at a Pl"Ofit. 
33y. A. Adelman; "The A&P Case: Astud~ in applied eoonomios 
Theory •. " Qua.rterly Journal of 15oonomios. LXIII. No.2. lle.y. 1949. 
341B!A·· p. 239. 
35Brief for t ht United States, PP• 110. ·"' -·· 
*Professor Adelman defines gross pro:tit rate as a di:f:ferenoi 
:;:::e:.!::u:o:: ~~.~:o:~oa:r::::e:b:; !:: ;~i:li• ~:~!i::!!Ji!~ude 
11 ts except the o oat of the goods, e uaua. 1 . . 8 008 
fit . or total ma.rg:Ln and to tal expenses by total sales . 
gross p.ro • . eak in terms of gross prof1t rate or gross margin, 
and therefore ;~ both expreaaed as per oentage o'! S&l.&fh 1!he gross 
and e:apenae ra . . f .. tailing service and of ·the , e:z::tense rate, 
JD8l'g1n is thafpr1ode oinrge that serv1oe. ~e difference or net profit as the cost o . ren er . . · ,. " 
rate 1a the net return to t he reta1le1:. 
'16 
The gov.ernment Md t he A& gree that t he lo':ll er t he gross 
ms.rgin; th larger t he sales, the lO\fer the expense rate. For 
example: 11'1 experimenting i th reduced prices in the last three 
quarters of 1937, theoompany was able to lo er ita gross margin 
from 18.6% to 18.3%. to !noreas ~eekly aales par store fran 
1104 to · 1226, to lower t he ex:p nee rate from 18.4T to 17.2 • 
. ~ ' 37 
and hence to increase the nat profit rate from .18!6 to 1.22,. 
Tho A&P, in order to serve its own interests absorbed :progres-
sively fewor resources per dollar or pt~r ton the goods it handled 
a.nd passed along to consumers a large part of the savings. Obv ... 
iouely, A&P "sold belovv Costs" which it might have incurred if 
it had preferred to stay at the old inefficient level. The govern-
ment insists that it should have stayed there. li.'ven if' tho A&P 
sales policy is nothing but price OQmpet1 tion, 1 t is 1 egi timate 
to a~k v.nether that competition might drive e.ll or most other 
firms out of business. and allow th one or few surv1 vora to ex-
ploit both consumers and gr o era. 
In other words if there are no limits to economies of lar e 
scale . compe t iton becomes self destructive; for the larger a 
firm, t h e lower become its costs, t he lower its cos ts . the more 
it can cut prioe to gain more business and :further lower oosts ••• 
Unless tbere are concrete facts to sho that monopoly will oer• 
tainly or probably result. t he.l4epartmant of jUstice 1a in effect 
3
'1 Adelman, op.oi.t .• • P• 240 .. 
,, 
atta.c ld.ng oo :pet1·U. on on no botter ·l"Ollnd than an economic gener• 
li0 tion whioll ma9 be quite 1na.ppl1c ble to tho case. ·he anti-
trust 41v1s1Gtl considered a.e irrelevant tho ex. rt teatimonythat 
38 .).; 
the eoonomie)a of food retai~ing impoasi bla. ,,,., · ta pre en ted show 
;~~~r 
that A P's share of tho ootional mnrket had at b at remained stable 
since the early 1930 'fh 
.Integratiop. ... 
Tha integration of tho A&I/ has also been used to support 
t he charge of "selling belo · ooat' . 39 The g:reat bulk of the c om-
panies profit has been derived from mnnufaotur1ng 11 the collection 
of advertising allov;o.ncee, and quantity discounts. he alleged 
restraint of trade is best put in the 10:rda of the government 
brieft 
~e profits from the non-retat.l and of the bua1n&ss subsid• 
1zed \$lr.•·' rets11 business, so that the latter oould operate at un-
eoonomio profit r ate, a. privileBe not poaaible to &l? 'a compe titors. 
This the government contends ia an inherent abuse of the 
vertical integ~ation of A&P 's system.40 
~e Department of Juatioo proolaima again end againthat it 
is not oppos~d to integrat ion as auoh. only to its m1asuee.41 
Certain items ~e excluded from ~etail prof1 for purely 
formal aoo.ounting t:-easons and mu.st be added bo.ck. dvert1s1ng 
e.llo anoes and quantity diaoounts are reduotions 1n the cost of 
~~~ds 1 pUttohas~! · and to call purchasing a non.re ail operation is 
58 Adel man, op.o,i t., p .• 244~ 
39Ib1d 40nr1e~ fer tha Uni t ed States, p ., 86 . 
41 
.· it 2 5 Adelman , .!m.t, o. , • P• 4 • 
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e.bsur .... hue , e are left wi t h the subats.:ntis l profits a.tt:ri-
buted to A&I ' s ma.nufe.cturin • .~.hat is, goods have been trans-
ferred from the mar1uf acturing to the sellin department at 
m'" r ket prices and profi ts or losses calculated for t h o A&P 
factories . The purpose of t he oom:pany •s accounting syster. has 
undoubtedl y been to pictu~e its manufacturing and retailing 
seperately 1 ac. if' ea.ch one sold or bought in the open mar ket 
r a ther than to and from eaoh other. But i n :f'aot t he manu£act-
uring plants do not . sell. and the atores 1 war ehouses do not 
buy. To do so is an accounting f1ction .. No r.oa.n can make a 
pro£1 t by sel l i ng to himself. 
Intagr a. tion,however oa.n be objectionable . but:;inesa 
concern may oontinue for many years t o mn.ke things fhioh 
could be made more cheapl y outside.In this ca.se ,if its 
Books were set up like .A. &:.P . (by setting u.p a ma r ket price 
on goods transferr ed from one department to another a.n c: that , 
s o long as t he ear lier stages of any int egrated C·Ompany 
ooul d be said to earn anything, however l it t l e ,thes e 
f'i c ti ti ous '' earnings 11 c ou.l d be ''siphon d n to abuse oompe t i ti on 
i n the l a ter stage s , there ·,roul d be lit t le or no pro£1 t 
earned at the ea rlier stages . 
A. t.c:P • ' s f a ctories bas been so much more profitable t han 
large i ndependent manufacturers of food products for t w 
r easons (l) The manufacturing plants have an assured mar ke t 
and can nm along profitably and etea.d.ily at a.n optimum 
level of operations .C 2) There is no lar e selling coat and 
'19 
advertising cost of the non-integratod food prooessors!2.here-
foxoe1 relative profitability is used a.s a first a pro:ximation 
to relative efficiency. Thie saving benefits both A&P and t he 
economy as a whole. ~ese are the gains which oompett.tt>n is 
supposed to bring about. The l aw ev!dently regards t hem in a 
different light. 
!ffi,yin,s l?olioy ... 
Th~ buying policy of the A&P may be t he moat i mport t 
sin le is ue and is undeubtedly t he mos t complex. It is noc ... 
essar y to disentangle t wo di s·t inot aspects (1) oovera. e of the 
~arket (2) inducing sellers to d1scrim1nate.43 
(1) Coverage ~ the market ... 
'~ }f; ) n i mperfect mar~et 1 oontainlng not a oingl e :price • 
~ · w 
but a spread of :prioe , cen be oxpl .Oi ted by a l a :tg buyer ho 
oan be r all over· the pl a.oe" at any C!'1ven momellt and t a: e the 
best offers. The effect of suoh a buyer is to :narro ' t he r nge· 
of prices. lower their nva age and make for a single prlo$ in 
'the mer · ot. Zhe l ar e buyer may undercut sellers directly by 
reselling some bar a1n offers )liob he cannot use or be may 
s6ll off vigorous pric& o . pe i t on a.t a l ater stage i r1 t he pro• 
duotive or distributive stage. A&P did both. 
fb) Brokerage -
Food prccaasors and packers commonly sell to d1 tributors 
throu h brokers -;rho :ra pai d a certain .EJeroen tage of t he list 
80 
44 price . :F ha~ tte _.pte to ct as its o-:;m . :ro -01' l'l.d t o 
collect ito :fe i n the form of n eguivilant ro uction in th 
li t price, l eavi ns the ne t price to tho s ller unchanged. 
fbo overnment he.a devot ed volumes of teotif!lOD3 and o:xhi 1Ji ts 
simplN" to demonstra.tG tho faot that a brokt3:ra _,e $quiv 1 nt as 
allowed to &~ buyer an especially to its produce buyin 
46 
suboi cl i nry. 
The Atlantio Comm1s ion Company, incorpora ted in 1926 1 and 
knovn as AOOO buys about seventy five r cent of tl e fruits 
and v getableG that are us d by A&P in retailin and manutaot-
urin,. 'fhe remainder· is purolmsed by the individual store man-
46 
a. )e:r or by tho unit buyers from looal produoers . 000 has 
served and aoted not only as a purchasing agont for A&P but 
4'/ 
al so as a sal s a.uent for certain suppliers. . In other :vordst 
ACCO not only bou~ht £or a&P, but i t represented the seller in 
dealing '.71th other bu9ers who w r oompeti tien to t .. e A& • The 
overnment begin its oha.rgao agairtat ~.coo b.Y stating &P had 
sought to obtain fo·r themselves •. under th threat to n. tl1dr aw 
their patrons e , ayatem t ic discrimi natory prioe profereno a 
over their retail oompot tors in the purchase of produce, 
The first cba.r.e agai nst ACC O oonoerns i ta brok rage 
aotivities from 1925 until 1940. ~he government stat d t at 
t h oo:rnpany had oompelle • r(J. e:rs. shippers e.ndjobbers bet een 
44Adelman, 2E•OJ.'l•• 
46Ib1d,.t P·• 247• 
46u. '• v. ~he Great 
47Ibid ,, ~. 6-4. 
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A & ~ ~ea. • oil~ 67 li'o • "upp. 626 .. p.636. ~· .. ···'<f.·; 
1925 and 1936 to pay soc . l od brokerage fees t o ACC O on its 
purchases of produce for A&:P •s r olating subsidiaries • .a.COO 
81 
did not want to pa the supplie~ an unearned brokara~e fee and 
t hus increase the suppliers net pr1c.e received from A&P over 
the net price received from other buyers ho .rent throt ,h 
brokers• 
·lhen The Robins on.Patman Act was passed in 1936 , ACCO 
stopped t aking a direc t brokex•sge :fee and adopted a new system. 
During the period of 1936 to 1940• ceo is char ed of 
obtaining price preferences by i nducing rowers. shipper s. 
and jobbers to reduce i nvoice }?rices on produce purcha ed by 
ACCO by the 1ount~. paid previously as brokerage fees. 3e.in, 
A P anted to avoid payin the .. m:ppliers a higher net price 
than he ordinarily received. In t he suit brought by the Fed• 
era.l Trr.ul,e Com,miss1on in 1940, AOO O was ordered to atop the 
48 pr act ice and di scontinue accept1n dlscri Jinatory prices. 
The government char gee that A&P has caused ACCO to under-
t ake a series of i ncaaistent functions and obligations by 
sating as a. representat ive for both A&P and the other companies 
a t the same time i n its buying and selling ac t ivities. It te 
clai mod by the courts that, a.s rep resertative of the seller 
or shipper, ACCO had the oppo:ttunity to iok tho coicest produce, 
and as t he buyer• ACC·O ooul abt a.in tht3 p roduce for P at the 
lowest possible price in the market. 49 
46G;rea t A ~ :P v, F . T, c., 106 f2d G6'1(3rd Oir. 193~. ). 
40 · ~~~ ,ft~ : ... 1 v. Groat A & P Co. • 7th Oir. Ct. Appeals lie. 9221, p., 6. 
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:l:he Court ata.toc. th t und r a eo is ·· on i ven in a pr avi ous 
oa o, t ho S" e ..,ars on co.m1ot not :for hi msel f ru1d nt the s o.rne t i me 
':;·· th r espec t to the }Jarne master • as an agent for nnothor uhose 
inter ests ar e oox f llo t.i n!CI' . Thua 1 a per son cannot bo a purchas er 
of pr operty and at t he same t i me • an a~ent for the vondo~ . 50 
ACCO• i n 1 ts duE~.l agency a spec t o.l so i s accused of actin ., 
o.s bu.y i ng br okers for j obbers an a.s an LCL (less than ca rload 
lo ts ) buyi ng agent for t he s ame j obber s for M~•a retail1n sub-
sidiaries. ~e Cou.r t cl a i med tha t COO would iva its LCL bus-
i nes s only to t hose j obber s wh o bought i n carload l ot s f rom the 
company . i'hi s me nnt that if the jobbers wanted to hol on to 
AbP proc1uoo us i n .,ss they f i rst had to buy in l a r ge quanti tiee 
from ACCO and then resel l t o 1 t i n soaller <lUant i t ies . 
· COO is alleged to have obtai ned another t ype of di s crim-
inati on di scount by c o~pelling t he shipper to extend cash di s -
counts t o ACCO on ita purchases of pr oduce :for &:P t.ri thout r eq-
ui r i ng 1 ceo t o assume the usual risks undertaken by cash buyers . 
Thi s t ype of buy i ng i s knovrn as F . o. n. sh i pper bas is . By t hi s 
i .s meant , ceo di d not e.ssume "Ghe risk, but made the seller 
responsi bl~ f or the c mdi tion of the good.s until they arri ved .• 
The seller had none o:f the usual advantages of the trensa.ct:lon 
exc ept thnt AOCO pa i d i n oash • • t!s mesnt that the seller uas 
gi ving an unearned discount t o 1~.cco. 
An other buying praciii co that the oourt ob j ected t o i s 
tha t of o alleoting unnecessar y . and du:plic t e broker age fe es 
50 
i ard 11 v . Uni on l?aoif i o r, r . oo . • 1.03 u. s. 651,266 1 p .5o9. 
on produoe transaction ong others t hen ceo, where no 
brokerage service has been rendered by ACCO and 1here the 
actual brokers e service has bean previously performed and 
collected by ind ependent brokers • In other nords hen a 
buyer has made a purchase t hrough a.n independent broker in 
order to maintain the goodwill of AOCO, he haa to arrange 
the transaction throu h ACCO and pay AOCO the brokerage fee. 
It may be asked why is i t rong for a firm to do its 
own buying and pay a lower gross prioe. Consider t ro buyers 
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at the same looe.tion. 62 One of them buys goods delivered. t he 
second buys F. O.B. and performs the t·ransport function himself • 
If both of them pay the same price to the seller. it is obvious 
t hat the second 1a suffering d1sor1m1nation. He is paying for 
e. service he hims l:f' performs, and the seller is gett ing a hi her 
net return trom him than from the other. The middleman or brok-
erage f'unotion is closely analogous to the transport function. 
It A&P paid the sam9 prices aa those who bought through brokers 
the net return to sellers would be greater on sales to A&P. In 
mal'lY oases strong sellers, atren thened by the Robinson•.Pa t man 
Aot foroed them to buy at list price and pocketed the differenoe., 
A sys t em of identica l l is t prio -Hs t o a l l b~ers >Tee.k .ns 
the ur e to finc:1 or set up cheaper distribution me t hods. Can 
A & P buying off ioes really do a better ~ob than independent 
brokers. 53 
52 Adel man op.ait ., p. 248 
63 I bid P • 24 8 
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~he A & ? subsidiary handloa a lon er f low - from the field 
t o the warehou:.;1e , a.s ag inot the independants \Vho oper ate 
a.t ter minal mark:.ts - yet its gross margin , the price of 
the service . is actually l/3 to 1/2 as l ar ge as that of the 
f i rma ':Jho do a smallor job . Any n t advant age to the Company 
from ope r ating the buyill.. off i ces ould be in their net prof'i t. 
~he governm.ent holds th t ill gal x-estraint of compe ti t ion 
exL~ts in any business firm 'I hich can { 1) be se t u a s more 
than one aceount t ng und profit maki n- unit ( ) or di rectly 
or indir .. ctly sel l s nyt hino- to compe titors . From thls e 
.educe busi ne ss profits i a. ooi ft end t herefore the return 
on every opa.r a. te trr.-nanoti on 1a a subsid.y to e-v ry other,. 
making each one t separ ate act in r estr aint of t r de. 54 
Induoin. ~ sellers t o discriminate 
Lever age of Priv t e Brands : 
The buying ; sellin • and manufacturing polic1 s of 
A & 1' ar e all1epitom1zed in one aep ., ot v;hich t he ov~rnment 
itself hae.vily em .>hasi~'.ea,. The A & P has the alterna tive o:f 
(1) buying branded goods ( 2 ) putt i ng its ov~ l abel on 
unbranded i tems (3 } manufac turing for i tself, aoain for i ta 
l abels . 56 
~e consumer who buys under its 1 bel is no lonp;er 
r es t ric t ed t o buying food plus the expensive services of 
l ar ge sel ling f orce. This i s desirabl e, But the gover nment 
in the case of Ra.l ~: ton-Purina Co. says A & P us ed bla ckJack 
54. I b id p 248 
-
65 i?J!id • 248 
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methods t o o:xnct 1 disaount. 56 In 1939, A & F ;as receiving 
. . -'I . fro m this compwy a discount that \h .. s 50",11'.'1 1 · l .. g ~r th .-n t h a t 
0 1 ven t;o any otlvn• Ral ston p u .. chsser. Bu.t J\ & J? ·- s not 
s .~tib:fi ~; a. I t i n:iorrnod R.l ~J ton the..t it .ns contemplating 
u Oifl{g ir1t0 the businees of manufactu.rinoo f ak s, an 1 t 
muld be deterred f r om this course only by a su.bs t t::.n t.tu1 
increase in i;ribute from A & J?, Fa c ed ~;r i th ·this t hreat • 
& 1r-ton fin lly agreed to increl" .... .~ e i t s lre ndy discrimin• ... tory 
price. preference to A & 1~ fran 7-~ o :mts :per c· oe to 17~-¢ . 
!rhis '\7as an oxerci se of monopoly po7Jal'. 
A & ·;: indueod a smal l manufacturer. Comet Rica l1ills, 
to l~ rant A · l? a 6° l"ebnto on su.les to A & P in return 
-Or certain "sto:re displays" to be m 'd of Comet •s product .0 7 
A ~; l? then i nstructed its store managers toot it would be 
sufficient r eturn for this 6~ price oOt.H)e oo.i on i f t hey pl aced 
a :fm; p 1.0k' ge s of CoLt Rice anywhel:'e vi thin the vision o:f 
A , P' s oustom~rs . So ~hat the 3Upplier got was u fev 
paolrages of rico . pL oed nS'"~:Vh ;re within th visi on of the 
customer and "- tc l? obtai:nt;J d a 67'! r ebate . 
l?inen:p le jnic titwa.s bought at l5 .... 20l't below the :prices r.a. i d 
by othe r gl'oc·ers . A s i ngle eme.ll suppli er was f orced t o :pay 
~40,000 ov ,r 3 years for ii:ho.tever udve:lrtising sut:;por t f"l- & :F 
chose to give his produc t . A & P received a reba te of 
$322,682 f rom Ra.ls ton-l>urina Co., i n e. li t tle ov r 2 years 
56 .Q.ongr eseions l record Oct . 6. 1949 p 3 
57 Ibid 
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by 1 ts threa t to manuf acture corn flake ,.. in compe ti t ion "VI i th 
Rn.l s t on. 
Jn ,the ye ars 1939·1941, t hese reba t 0s collect .d by 
A & l? fron reluct ~mt :~anufacturers tot t1led $20,600 , 000 , 
These predat o:ry ·1 counts and oth r pr~forencea ounted 
to 22 ,15 ' of A & F*s to t al profit~ in 1939 , 22 . 47; in 1940 , 
an 24 . 59~ in 1941,58 
Concl usion 
The A & P has ... r-ent ne l y 5,000 ,000 in a propa anda 
cem:paign to tell the eopla t t t this a.nti- t ru '"' t au! t h a 
boen file d a in• t t he.m bee use th y r"~ se l l ing f ood a t 
59 lOi."J :pric0s. ·· They say they a!" being a.t ;. a ckod becau s e they 
h· :VE) gro,·n 1 r !';o throur h ef.fi c i ncy and economy, A & P 
maintain tha t th governm Jn t vanto to d stroy them because 
they are bi ·, avon if the ubllc suffo c:. in th proces s. 
This new, unexpected, ~ nd unjusti fie d ttuok upon them 
3 says A & P, vdll isa f od pricoe, ~ill penalize 
eff ici ency , will dest roy A & P and every other efficient 
chain store in the n t on. 
Ho wev r, as has boen p:pint ad out • forma l ~-rooeedings 
in the c a ...:: .vere begun be cause of A & P ' s brut 1 coercive 
t ac tics which r., ave enslaved independen t manufa.c tueers. 60 
Thi s sui t wi . 1 end A & l.' ' s pr Qt ice of f orcin . consumers in 
on rea t o subsidi ze A & :P ' s price var in another. 
58 ..!.!!.!! :p 3 
59 I bid p ?I 
60 I bid, f! 3 
-
Prices in moot of A & 1? ' s O\-"ln stor · .., s ould co. d o ·m <rhen 
thi s ;.,Vil p:rocodur :is :forbi ·l don. 
This Jend 'no -ui t wil 1 no "' r e. i. Ge pri c as It , .. 11 
in ~pen m t , ro c,~ ry ,tore.,. 1-(:~o rnu ::J t no 1 pnJ .li .. , 0:-.. r c a 
61 beca1, e of vhe r e b -.tes ':l· ·'c ~ .£ P S Cr as . 
Over 00(./ o the \m9r· c tl.I'l :public · uyo ·.n groc -,:, r y stores 
~ thi ~ ... u i dy 
pa , , to A '~ :.?,, T- , . . ~, ~ e:n i n;.;, cu·· t iiill ;,_ the·3e ,J ,. it i es 
r nd onr· 1 ·l· , es s~o - es to 1'" n .o 1~ ... i i' :pxi ces . 62 
lwcon a ~ r't _ :::.. r e ._., ·on,__. c · .. :::. J.n ~1hic 1 -:;1i 1 i t ~el£ b .... 
:~ ry bit o~ Fv~ il ble 
p ovte t·J}lich .. i. . c l .. hr..s 
· , Jl '-1' :; -· . t n t , l nc1. 
8'1 
I 
h i U::\ _ icL to~ of c :!. 1.iJ , ~ -.. t- r-:nd : ! .t:ono.l '"' 
65 
:-""• :rticnl r ly 
F~<1 ;·:r:.: .. ~11 t; l - ;;r :w t l c.-, . 
62 1..h!,.q 
63 Ib (1 
-
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'i:his one cha in i s so l arge ond pov.rerful th 
gov ~rnment i s ss~- x.· ·. unable to cope ~~th i t for tho purpose 
of c ompelling the concern to operate lo ally and on the s i de 
of t e r i ht. Thero ar e ~ut just enou h peo~le i n the 
Department of Justi ce and Th Feder al Tr ade Com.mi ssion,,and 
they do not have enough money t o properl y police this one 
concern. 
l f our na tion iS to r etain ita character as a free . 
competitive,democratic s ociet y in hioh t he onl y limitat · on 
upon the .bili t .v of the in ivi ual Iran t o row and prosper 
with t he community :r :at s in hin own energy and 1nitintive , 
t hi s uit agai nst .,\ & :P mu. t succeed . 
It ll 1:3 been st te th t the ki nd of beha.vior the 
64 
gover 1en t 1 ~ t ryi ng to enforce 1 "" as follo't7a; 
1. compl(ttoly rigid co :..;; t - prioe nosi ion ... A f irm shoul d 
not cut' price t o attract busine ss. He should price t ho 
lUIS merchandi se cost plus oxpemses plus a r ofi t. 1nd co ~~ t 
mus t cont inu ... t o be fixed a t ifhut it ha.JYpened t o b · yes terday . 
611 mu t no t cut pr i .ce below y e ·ter day ' s o o~t for the sake of 
mor e busine ~ s a t a remunerative lower cos t tomor row. 
2. ~Sidity ~f Economic funct ion • A r e t a iler ou~ht no t 
to wholesale or manufact ttr e: for ef:t io ient op~rati on in these 
fields would give him an advantage over hi s r iv ls \"lh ioh is 
un:f' ilr to eok. But there is n obj oction to c i n : 
ineff icient job and ga ining no advantao-e. 
3 . Abandon t he promot i on of price aompet i t i on - To sprea.d 
l OO: er pric s , throut.~llOUt the mt: rket, or to obtain lo·; r 
pri.oes , or t o i nduce a sppplier to s pend le ss on advertising 
nd pass the savin~:s on t o the Of nsumer a r e di sapproved . 
4 • A an on discrimination of the s ort which may and 
usuall y d.oes promot e oompeti tion. · Ho :vev t~ r , syst e tic 
I scr irrination desi ·n d t o su~press more efficient distri but ive 
6. Adel mn , op . clt p 256- 256 
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me tho s .nd the more uot i vo r i oe comJ etit i on ~hi oh they 
s t off .,. this lti n of dscriminr~ti on i s not only :pprov ·~ d, but 
requi red , 
Ti me alone wi l l t~JU us i f thi s is the overnment ' a 
i n tention. 
~his l ast oha}?ter is a summary of conclusi ons reached 
in our ·, :hol e in uiry. 
The uuther has a ttempted to show to the reader in t he 
previoua chapt er s the f acto r s which l nd to the p S"'r:o o of 
the Robinson- Pa.tme.n Act. It was deem :necess!1ry to pass 
t h is ac t to pro eot tho s l l i ndependon.t retaile rs ainat 
th co~potition of the aggreaaiv 1 rge buyers dt t hoir 
superior bare ining pO'. !Gr, Congress vmntec1 t o · rotain the 
l arge number o uni t s essenti o.:.l for coJnpoti tion , t i l l i ng to 
sa.or i f.i ce the efficiency of the l arger firms .. 1 
I t a•· sho m tha t t he <'!h erman Aot of 1 890 had many 
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we e ~sas , .. ;hich led t o i t s ineffective u.;;e. 2 Trusts developed 
a.t n increasing r ete wi th nothiilg to pre ent their gr o 1th. 
Price discrimilu•tion and tho u ... e of r:uanti tt discounts r ew 
al ong s i d.e ·i t h the cxpan._ ion of t he true ts . 
The Fe . oral Tr cle CommL. sion Act ta · · passed v:i t h the 
Cl ayton Act of 1914 to prevent pr i oe iaxrimination d t o 
prevent e. le soening f competi tion \Vhich Pould be promot tve 
of nonopoly. 
ti t h t he grouth of Chnin Stor ac t ivities ·in 1920 's 
~.nd 19'7Q• s , and t he subsequent Ch in Sto r o investigati on, it 
2. See Oha.:ptor II; Fa e 16 
as sho·m1 that chain stores trere oppressi n => tho small 
businessman. This had to be stopped .1ddit1onal l egislation 
1as the only solution.An amend .ant to the Clayton Act 
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came into exis tence :vi t b the H.obinoOll ... Fatman Act . I s 
amended . prico discrimination betwe n purchawers i s unla ·ful if 
it substantially loosens competiti on or tends to create 
a monoptlly in any line of oommerco,or 1here t he effect 
may be"to injur , · estroy , or prevent C(•mp ti tion \. i t h 
any p r.:: rson who ei t h .. r . grants or lmo :rin ly rocei os t h e 
bene:fi ta of such di s crimina tion . or ~·i th custom r .., of ei thor 
of them. " 3 
Thi s ne; languoge makes i t bsolutely ole ,,r tha t 1 t 
i s t ho intend d policy of t he Con~ress to protect mor , th n 
the competi tion between produc rs and manufacturers . It i 
enou~h t o ahm that oompeti tion i th cert in per s ons , n mely, 
t, i th th discrimi nator o1· rJith t he f avore buy · rs , is i njured , 
dest royed, or prevented . 
' 
I t has l s o be er1 sho~·m ho v tho Fe oral :4-'rude Commi s sion, 
ent r usted wi th the adminis trati on of t he Ac t , i s constantly 
on the :ra.toh fo r firms Tho attempt its vi ol at ion. iola tion. 
in other mrds., by abusive quantity <ii s counts and other 
discriminat ing methods. The · ~ton S lt Company i s n 
axanpl e of a oompeny with a di scrimina tory disoo1mt Q~hedule , 
uppo edly e.vail a.b .a t o a ll custonLI·s, ye t only f ive 
cu.hl tomers could ac tually benefi t by its discount sch~dul • 4 
~his is, · i thout a doubt , assuredly di '~criminatory! 
3. Purdg, o~.c it ., p 410 
4. See Chapt r v. 
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This orton Salt Cas o io the first suit in 7hi oh the 
govornuo1:t GO il1i t i a ·ad l'roceodinc-•s ~ .. a L . st '1 irr in r a r ds 
uo tho u.busi ve usa of quunti ty disco nts . This C "l' "IO is no'! 
·the nort for cui;.,,..., involvin c.!_u nti t~· dincoun ·s I h' ::; boen 
shov;n i thi~ co.Ge, t c.t economic t eory ello ·S < u(':tnt ·' ty 
discou.nts to e is'G ··· s rn:.ch , but th .t :·l on the., are used a 
a 10 nc t fo.vor t 10 lc..:r .·er uyer and oppre s t 1 e naller 
b- or, tl~on the <:- ovornrnont rnm:t intervene to prevent thi 
inequity. 
' 1 ~0 Grea t .tl antic ond ~~oi io 6ompany also hus been 
£hovm .. o be in violation f the her a.n ot and tho bincon-
Futman Aot . ~hio camp y , by virt ·e of itL si~e, could 
orce it3 orm t orms on its au)r liers• It . tho ·efore , obtained 
a:J:>¥ qu. t i '3' · iecount it t coir cd. If e conptJ; ::y failed ... o concede 
to th ir teres, l' .. & hreo.tened to .roduce the pro uct 
i iiBelf or shi ft o nother su:ppli t)l" ho t-,oul d yiel "-o their 
dar. and • 
A oo I f .. l s o violo.ted Section 2c of the Robin· on- J?at an 
.r~ct. After the em .. c ment of 'the .Act , the comp ny d · r ecte t\ 
i ts fi 1 buyer t o redt_ce th ir buyi n;; pr:i.ees by t 1e 
amount .of th~:; br okorage ·.r:!iCh t t had f ormvl'ly r eo .. i ved . The 
company maint - i ned that in buyin) di r ectl y from .~-ir o t-hnnd 
proeuc rs , it saved tho o ponse of u bro er. But s ~as 
poin e in Cha_ .- t e r V, this t7aS ro _. ctcd on the vie that :an 
employee of the buyer cannot rendor services to a seller. A 
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buyi n · and selling servi ce cannot bo combined in one pe rson. 
In conclusion , qunntity di scounts ~ whi ch are n on-
cumula t i ve disc ou.nts ba .;;~ ed upon the doll · r amount bough t 
£- t a s i n .,l e time and usual l y ali v rod a t a s i n le pl a ce 
muet b a ll07ed. 5 It has been sho~~ that a buyer of 
1oc .ooo p .. i rs of shoes hould r eceive a quantity disc ount 
a s contrasted against a buyer 1ho buys only 1000 pairs. 
Thi s i s lo ::~ ical e conomic rea.s onb1g when e conai er he 
s o..v-i ng in cos t o:Z tr n por t tion. msnufa.et YL in • and 
deli .. er y t o the seller. These discounts mus t ,..., re;}Ul t;'ted 
onl.9 :ihen t h ey become form of prico. disc r iminat ion. 
None of tho var·ous t y ~s of qu·ntity disooun o are 
inherently ei th ~ r l awful or unla\"r.ful. Any of them may be 
unlawful if it iG gr smt ed lrr.tder circumetro1cos in whlah 
ccmp · ti .i on is injured en · if no.:r;.e of the defense s se t 
ur i n the .... ot ate availa ble . 
Any of them may bo law~1l if no i njury rasulte from 
1 ta rt nting, or if s ~· vin .. , s in oost propl~rly a ttributable 
to tho JYUrcha~:es ;;hich receive t he di s counts a r e suff icient 
to .us ti:f'y it. 
To bo l ar1ful . quant i t y di s counts should meet t ·1eso t e s ts 
t o be cce t abl e under t he I obi nson .. Pa t man J c t . 6 Di soount 
classes mu;: t not bo und• ~ly l ar e und too f a in nur b r. The 
boundaries bet een clas a s mu .. , t be reasonably pl uoed. No 
cl ns mU ('l t rec ive a di s count , .. ,h ich is e~cessive as compared 
5. ]rreer, P~ooounting Pt!tJbl ams Under, the Robi son- l?atman 
Ac t , ( J.i,rom a ape eoh presented t o the Phil a.del h i a Chapter 
of Pam1 In t i tut of C.., l: ~A . , Ua.rch ~24 . 1938 •• 
wi th t hoBe ranted t o other ol a.Bses . 
I th disc unt clt:J:..., es are b? oad, th cos of ervin 
the different customers · ·i thi n the s e • . 8 1 S3 ·:rill ~ bo 
a·soi ili o.r . 
U:tlrepro sm. tnt 1 ve of cu ... t ome rs n t the bo~"rJ.c rJ.ry of ~h ol 'sa 
.JGhe r6 i s li re l y to be an indefen.:~ibl disoriml nt:.t ion 
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be ue n the l a rge t buy !'>:> i n one cla s "' t.n he .... nnll es t buyers 
i n the next . 
Somoti ea, :?or - ... am· -,1 · 
"'"' i.;' • a par of tho sel l ers bus ine s 
consists of t~ vo 'r t o 1 stna.l J. urch oes .,rhich ho ocopts a s 
conv nienoe to his u~toners a a ~.ry high cost to hi -
s lf. If i n preparin~ a ~u tity discount soh dul , he i n-
cl u LdS in hi s lo . .: ot qu nti ty , racket both th nuisnnce" 
th regu.l~ r :s t ock ortl rs of his s e~ 1 customers , 
th .f ec t i~ to Ch"'rge th se mal l ou"'to er .ith nearly 
"t 1e n t ro coGt of .he 11nn1sanoe" business . t c rai se t he 
appar·nt co ~ t of s~Tving thQ , and to appe ~r to justify 
for t1o l&.r .. r cufl o .e rs discount \h:toh i s r ea er uh n he 
f v..ct s '1 r~:-ant ., :.~.his i ~:: t.:ll ,_,Xl. •• Jle O:f 8 diSCOunt cl ~:3S 
ich is e~togother to l ·rse . 
Si mil arly , i .(' t '1c 1 .. r g r portion of th fl 
business i s combined ·.r1 th the small0:r por t ion of th 
commerciall y attr n ... t ive lJusinJ· S pl od y smal l custo ers. 
the re~ulting cl s s m~y not be t oo l ar , but i ts boundari a 
uill be imp11eperly loc .... ted and ·t;h ~e nay be an unlu ul 
i scri i nntion. bet'k:een the am"',ll st cust m~: rs ·nd the next 
De t er min .ti on of' tho S1Z r .nd bound arie s of cu tom r 
he o ts of 
P. -.~ ~ - n m- t ·cl of c.iscov "' ry ~.hore Cl. hot.r 
i11g busi.ne s ch~ ;e n ot conspi cuous l y . 
I . depends rot r; e~- 1 · pon .... cost tmc.i ysis, ut .l E~ o upon 
5 
. _ ·· l y is of t ho rkct to di ··· covEJ r ;rh •~t urc ases O.:..i _, in te 
i _ t . s .... r c \' ay ""' • p .. coo t tho same ki d of trans ot ion. 
Ci vcn _ -aeon& lo s ~ten of i s count class a . u 
t :.Eli ut i on of t o r: .::cimun discount t.h · cl. C" e 
·u:•t i :f·· ~~ i s str· i g h fO J.'ViBl't co :..: t accolm"'iug. Fi r s nho 
u -to .. o : d i n t • v . on ndc ,urt .... ccoun ·inB oys ·e , 
r.~.o 1 evol p 
of io tribut i 1 , c a. ... 
:,y te o:f a cco nti g -o·" c "' ts 
ing bus n ::men to o not 
onl lo~r o.bid1ng . but aloo nore o:f:1. i cien · • 
immodi·· t 1JJ.Oi.:l c -;e 0 coo+n !'!1( ... e e .... i a :!.e b t 0 ct h·_ve 
oft~..r 
"' 
··ov { t o bo i:n d z: , f'.to .. 
tc a. ... l ow .,"-i n tl .. o f irm ' s 0 s of ace unt 
t el l 
di..l'1'G :.."' nt ty . on o 01 ..:t~mo:r.s , to fill tLe or c: t f .i f e :r.ent 
to ... UI>PlY t.l L. crcn · vol ne o oo, v i n a .::. von 
period . 
Th obinson• Pa t an .Li ct ha.e no llin in ·· t to penaliz • 
8 er 0 or diocoure,o ofi eie.ncy. nho:e s nothing in i t 
to f. p r iC CfJ , or enabl~? t 0 f :c t ion of ric es ~ nor t o the 
l i m t the :fre .... d .J. price :lo-t r:1cnt s i response to .ar et 
con 1 ,iono . 
Any phy ic 1 cconomtr ... s thet re t o be :fo i n mas 
exL.onse, r ctr or such nus-. .... . r1o e of the .. re 
d1sturbe by t is 1J.ill ~ lor do ,:J it ·· nfr i n .·::e t o s 1 1 r ' s 
fr ,c· on ('lh fro dom be-· n ·; to r i ._,h t to t;iv · a pa1t 
or nl l of the bene -· '!, " of t e s c. .. ving so o:r:·ec ted to othvra 
~i th hom he d t. .1 ... ' \"! et lli.."' r in h i !;;:b ... r ,_ "'r.t,:,:o s pai d t o 'h 
pr d'" <L r fron ·.;rhom h e buys h'i<:~ r n.r; ms.t :-~ ri -1 
' 
or in i ~ ~ r 
Wa.f!'o .. : t o th .z e -;h o l•bo:r in J: rod1. ct i on or handling ~ his 
goods , or in lo·r·~r r ic .c o the cu.;.;. ·omcr , includ · ng .._ e 
ul ti J& t conmmor \''h O buys t h .;m. 
~ o r :st . r Gti n of quality of opportuni ty in us·n s s 
'1,; 111 no t incr w: o p ri ce - to t L conl:rllwer'i U -~a ir 
pr ctic":S and r. onopoli :.: t c J:~ethod.s i.ich i n tho en <.1ec roy 
oom ti t i on L .ve ne ~1r in P.l h i story ro t5Ul cd i n a ay 
ben .f ici "' l t the :12bli L tore t , 7 On th contra ry , th y 
io of 1nd po~d~n 
man f~c tur r c, ~nd dominstion of t hct f ield of i ndu tr 
!11 t high r ~r." c:L s t o the consui..L r and 1 , r p-e p o i · to the 
o m .rs . 
I t _ t . c1 e .__ i g~ d :'"J :; tern o. · the -ob · L' o 1-
Ac t to .. _trcn:;:;then nl .i- trl?.st l <;\ s , pr -ven Ul'l:fu1r p ic 
di .,.crimi n t ' o " nd t o Jro ~w rv co'. o t i on · n inte r - ·a t o 
7 . I bi 
-
J6 
9'7 
c n ce . I t 1. '-~ hvlit' ·V f 1.1 lJiJ in t he i:a -. J. 0 ·:"j 0 p 0 'I t C ~ J 
COl'ldU r . L , ..; _ i 1. •• ,, :r· . 1l'tto~ c ,..jl:! i n"ti ·u··i r tj_ h c:.v e 
1'1;] -~ -,:. o· -': _1i iJ J. .. " . ;J ion i:- 1 -;;i l:. co <. uot s · n uS J.. 
" 
h o 0;;1 ly ,:.n ,. l ·1 O'UJ~ t ... 1l ; ~ o:!:· 1U1' o.i r .~..rt de lH"t. ·i a ' ..:~na >.J 
purpoo · O:t tl . {,.;.. i .x to 0 i ,, ~plo.i t h 
p ... oco ur - 0 tb t 0 t h · l!obi .;cn - Pc. 
A 
an 
t . t elL on pri di scri i a ·io· 0 00 co. fro 
y 0 ir cti m.'l • 
{ J.} 
{ 2 } By t J TO 'L· 
injun t on. 
( 3 } Dy c ivil sUit t OOI~ . on l u 1 by per ons i n;ju;r d 
:for o:L · 1 dt::. uLJ .Q , b .... ctn;tl:'i.ory ~ui t f r 
r blo d tma · s. r b suit for in~·· oti o 
(1) ~h edcr 1 :ru e Oor1 L .sion by Soc i on 2 of h 
Cl·yton L O~ io .iv n po 1 .1 uthori t y to enforc co pli nee 
i t l 3ootion 2 ;his au thor i t includ t ho 
po;-; .r to ont'oro th qu a tity limit thu.t it 
2 
osta l:i sh ao . o t o pro :Jont 1sorimi.n t i on. 
:fi.n ··nd 
speci i c p07ier i :.:3 giv ·n by t ho .obi a 11-Pu.t a.n. ct 
t o h odoro.l .\'~.do OoLl i :...cio t n oro ·ac t ion Z o the 
o ·, but undoubt dl y t ho -r:cr'1 rol Tra<' o Con . • s oion ·;ill proceed 
1. Cl yton ct - ~ lie o. 21 ~-6Sd Con~roes .obinson-
. ... tr:1nn ct P b ic o O) 69 .- l.l th Con ,ra• JS 
9 
·o t te . t to nforc 'acti on ~ upon the th or y th t viol ations 
of i t con t i tute Jilll:b:t:. n.n:f<,:.ir methods of co :pGti tt on h ioh 
"":re ~ cl,. _e un l .w-ful by P-oc t ion 5 of the Fe rf: l Trede 
Commi '-='Sion Act . 
,lJlether the Pe t: r o.l " r de Omr!li s sion acts under ' Ct ion 2 
of t he Cl o.yt on ot s amende , or uncler Section 5 f 
ed ·r 1 Tra a Co .i ns i on Act , the proceour o i s t he s 
h e 
3 
• 
he Co asi n Must i s ..,ue and s ar upon h lle ed 
vi ol a t or e. comr n.int s tn tin i t ch·r r:)s .. d oontaini n[" a 
notice of hea!'inP. upon a ~y an t a pl ce t ere in , tim: d 
a t le st thttt y day , f t er th service 0 the compl a int. 
The re s _ ond. ent ha.s the ri ~ht to p e r a t t e tim nd pl 
fi ed and sh :,' en ISe lhy n or- e ' shoul not bo nt .r d 
ce 
re ~uir'n hirn t o c · s 
in th c mpl ai nt . 
.nd d sis t froc th e~ iolo tio~ ch r ged 
As m- tt ·' r of J>rac~, tce ? e r the ru es r:- f .h Commission , 
t . r .on nt i B .: van t J ~ty ys irt icb. to ns·~ ·or n:nd if 
he ans ere the he 1'.trj.ng .. t th~~ timo ft e i n tho n t ice is 
poBt· !oned until a f t :: r th --~ t"' Snl'l' o· t he te • t imony - d t h 
re· 10rt of the t:ri 1 mi r 
r1y p rson may be allo;.v d on appli .a.tion and. on o us e 
shonto interv ~n ~ in 
~re.de Co ;mi. ,s i on. 
y rroc ,. n ;:;s be:for t he -:: r a l 
:f no u.ns r i s i ntG:r.:pos e by thP. r s ond r. t, t h ch~:· r -.es 
of t he co ])l a int az e t 1 en · a true 8-Xld in no:rmo.l cour ... a a 
----------------------
3 . ~ • .;;. 1 
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If • on lih oo:r:ttro.~.;v , :m :novrur is i.nt "'r ,o s · .. , ....  · r ,;;~timony 
·a.l"en , the Co i Bui on uot m 3S of the f act 
thor n roquirin _; he r L ··ona. n t 
t o CO!.!. ' .~. n'l. u ,s·' ..;t l:l"O .l t ~.· Vi t l :.l t ' onn 0 .' ·'cl he i:.:; g 'lty. 
h r roc ·_, ,din _a 
h~ 11 hav bo n f lo .'. 1 · Ci:l:'cUi t Cour t o:.. 1-' a· 1 o ~ t 
ni t o St u · s ~ t: e Cor:uni " i 01 
u aauo a:• d · i .. ord l '. i · t.ho 
o ob y 
d ~ thi~~ to e fo~ce it r 01 
.. ". 
y c1od.if.Y or ,;;,'· t ._ · d · ony 
ra::.~ · 
It 
t~ ·i.;.J 
,: OJ: t ont ·a L .. or n l ects 
COl '1 
C~I 
.... 
... 
.• J ..:. i on 
only 
e r e 
o~ itcelf' 
Cirou i t 
t f ita 
~ ~ rs , ilin .ith ~ ta ~F i •tion a trb sar to t h 
ntir ~ oi" • i ol dine th he findi11v o · 
e Circui Cou t of .... pp a l may 
o or 1 r of the Co 
ir , o if , or 
It d ra o 
fi ~ ·1oe o modifi u ·· n i,. viola t e l • aubj .c t.,;> th 
violator t punishment .i:O't' conto ~ of ourt , 
lhil ho proceedings i s in th Circuit Court of 
ppG la , ~i ·r t e Co isuion or the rosponuent my a pp ly 
for 1 • v to pr cur e.dd · ional ~vidJnc , If ·10 ord ~ra 
tha t such ddition vi on b- e. d c d , i i e ta!t by 
th Co .Jsi on, .nd i · may mo iJ.Y ts · · n i n s or i t orde:r 
t o c o oc l"":J. deoi t ba s ,d upon ad i t.ional ·vi o c • Ther -
aft r, t Ci..:cu. • t Cour·t o:f Appeals :proc ..... • d a · .. in .h c a s e 
;. here no addi tiona.l evidence i n e.dduoed, X'be decree of the 
Ci :~·cui t Court of ~ppealo iS f i . l oxc · t for r vie . 
oortio'l:' ri b~- the Su.pr me Cour t . 
Th res:pond t i oase of n or r t o CO!:!.~ O '\Tl 
d~sist b~ the ~0 ar~·l ~r - ~e Cornmi N'! ion y obtuin a 
:r vi of the ord r ln tho proper Circuit Oourt of 
pponls by fil i ng a p ti tion s in . th .. . t the order of 
the Conmis ... ion b ~ .. t l. n co .. y of ·h 
:petition bz.s be n serv ed. lL n cjh · Co .. i"" s ion th 
Cor.n .:. Gion m s t cer t:· f r-
M t r nscr i t o tho rooo _ 
f 11n in the 01 cui t Cour t 
th.re fter th court has 
t1o s .e juri s i ction to a f irm; set asi de, or mo ify 
101 
th. ordAr of tho innion s in the c s e of n :plio tion 
by the Comrni s n1on f or t o enfor c _  en t of 1 ts order . 
5 ~ cense cnc dosist or ~;:;!" .• coml.S rn nd t ory (a ) 
GO da a f~e· t.c ord • s i snu d, if no eti ti on f or cou~t 
r ovia ilo with:n thn.t time , 0 ..,. . 
- , f ·} n on th 
expi :i.'a t on o ... th ti o t"'.l l o.m for f i li peti t ·i on for 
a rtior, ri ::...:• 1)r ovide in S- ction 240 of the Jndici 1 Co e , 
. f !10 S lCh r.cti tl On h 3 0 n fila 0 ; ( c ) upon de . r 1 
of peti t ion or cortior~ri , or: (d) 30 day 
Cour d o ..,i on 
te:r a Supr rna 
I f a co 1 r:uJ.y f .ila to cOr.l) l ~1i th ~ -n or .r a.ft r 1 t 
h ,_.:1 b cono I.Jarid '-~ to1y, 1 t c "" o fined up to · 5 , 000 or e a ch 
s · p~r~t violution, and it ~ 11 b lP to the ed rnl Tr de 
Co 1 .... s ·on to d~Jc_de ,. h r.l t conoti t utes e. ~- e pt r at violation. 
Your l'riains Prac t i ce 
0. Yor _, 1 946 , p . 23 
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( 2 ) ! no a 
the obinson- .P t m ·, ~ ct i :Pt:~rt of the Cl ~ Jton Act, nor 1 
C •y on Act F nnlti ,s c , l so i t o t fun 
';u.i l ty of r i co Bcrimine ion .• Uni t t ... t o D! ~1trict 
s - st n vi ol nt ion .. n c~se of cr ! lno. ~ ct on r en-
.y r n.r;e up to lo.ooo an ./ or t ,o y .... a r a i n p:ris n . 
I ci i l actiOYl s rou~l t, e. vi 1 .t or 
on'" .ne fr tl c 1t · nui If ho .r .::. "'tS 
in iol tion, he \/11 bJ i n con+ · .... ·, t of co r t. 
( ) ~ OS b f:Ln e· 0 r -r t • ' 
. ,, 
- 0 nju1e can ri:nc cui for t r· ple or t e lo ss 
1 hn::. f3UstoJ.no t J.lr ·v t· e in i i , ,1,. .n n co >.:1 e f'o r 
ln ru1ctivo .J. tcn""d 7 re .0 ns 
" 
r."i;_ u ,... 
• 
onet~ ry fin s or j i. ~ toncc~ arc no the onl y 
n !'L involvn · in violnt ng r-rlctng r , lutions . ~ince 
al r1ost; "' L etc B'es of cn:forcor.1ont proc . ur . ,... are r c rde 
:l.n t... pnblic _"' re os , comr.!'"1n '"' s r.ms t cotmt 1 the h .... ~r .. rds 
vor l o rublic or ion. if t hey b con on 
c on "". ro"' ·:: .,....s• o ~o r t1 oir r ci n ... : -c t c os . 
oth t ho F ,a r ~-1 Tra the Dep-rtment 
o. Juotice cnuo ro~u r rol ~c~£ ~o the , ect r · .1 Trade 
Com i PS. on iue : s ~ h - oo £ ~ int ~~uga f t ~ e ~ , ven 
l O 
before it h~c d t .r · i ned ·hot ' ~r vlclc.t i on h s a.ctuaJ~y 
Occur:re I it ' D I ,[:;, t ,.., ~. f u"'.t1c r ubl.city • 4 - il .t 
r el eases on <.I.e c 3 0 re u.c all y l . u.cd ut '~ ,,..., J._ . .... t i ne a uUi t 
i }., fir ' t "' i l c • 
I 
I , ooks 
Y rk, 
t 
.. ork 
o_ k, Rola.n 
~: o:rn , 
~· io-..1 ror -,_ 
ll 
I I 
Co itte of the Ju 
74th Co ·-' r oss ; 
J - • 6, 1936 
1502 
Oomm1tt3c 
74th 
31) 
c 
t of tho 
... -· 
llo 
cba~cJ of h l st 
6 . 1949 
_ lie n o .. 692, 4G C _, ~ePs 
J OUl' t 
nati on . 
& p 
:f.1r r, l\.ccounting Pro l oms un er -tl c obi oo - l?atmo.n not 
U11i\. r t1~ac' e r- c ;.;ic ·:::m , 1950, C't . J?~.ul; ·. e ,t Pu l s .. :ng 
OJ.. ._n . · en ., -:"oux J::ric. n0 J?r ctic JS in 
1i r; Yor~r 1945 
.• l S , 1950 
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I V CASES 
A ric n Can Co . vs , L.:_.d 0 0 C(uming Co . 44• . 2d 763 
H. c. Bri tt Co . docket no . 3299 
Mlo r ton oalt co. vs. :l . T.c. 162ll . (2d ) 1 49 , 1947 
u. ~ . v . 'The ·ey Yor , · Gro .. t A & P T·: a Oo .. , 67 a . 
~u * 626 ( E. D. Ill. 1946 ) 
u. s. v . he New York r o t A , P Tea o., 7th Ci r . 
Ct , Ap e~l • no. 9221 (1949 ) 
U. , • v. The r Yor • Gr e t .. ~ & P mea Co. -Com-p·. 1nt 
in the South Jrn Di r::}trict t . ' . Y. Civil 1\ ot t on no . 
5 2-.1 39 
Van c .mp , &ons v.. . r ·c · Can Co. 2'18 D ~ :· ~45 , 264 
lard 1 1 v;·. Union P .c .fie B .. ! , Co. 103 u. s. 651, 266 1 599 
•._,. ... . . 
i 
As 1 e t i le india~tos , ·t l e p~· ") s o ol' · i s vo 'r J.;J o 
c O\' the offeot of unti-tru l a'< upon the bu.o osa :practio 
o:J. gr anting . uunti tJ!· di scounts • . I o.tt pt t o s 1 port y t h esis 
b3 shov;i that quanti y discounts er · justifiable nd neces-
sary • Ho ., ever • th y ust not ba used as o. · s of di ori · n-
a tion • .Cha funotio of the an i • trust l tns , i n thi respect , 
i s to help a check on h os e fir "' ~ho attamp 
perogativ of quantity discountc . 
o busa the 
',!y thesi s i s composed of six chapt ers to support y hypo-
t 11esi • Chapter I is an introduction to my thesis \Ttler I state 
the pucyose of PJS t hesis and th need of r -·ulatin __ quantity 
discounts , ! attempt to justify tha ne ed fer the regul at ion of 
quant i discounts so that th y ~.~ ill not b used as means of 
disc r i mination. 
In Chapter II. titl d "Robinson-..Pe.. tmun Ac t' , r easons :for 
its p ss ,e , I trace the historionl davelopm nt of an t i-t rust 
legisla.uion from the Sherman l ot of 1890 to tho ... ~obinaon-Patman 
ct of 1936. The -;o lmesses of he Sherman .Aot aro pointed out 
and the need for remodial le i s l ation. 'hese 1nclu e the oderal 
~rade Commission Aot nnd t he Clayton Act of 1914. 
The purpose of t hese t.1o ots a.a to pr v nt the l a r e 
£irma f rom us in o presaive tacti cs t o restrain and lessen oonp-
etit ton , But th ese t t o act • as is pointed out . also proved to 
have thoir shortcomi ngs , To ether v.i. th the _rowth of oh ain s tore 
o.eti vitio s in the 1930 •s and their r.lethod of ' thro~ lin t heir 
wei ht aroundn to gain mat ever terms t hey d em nded • the ema.ll 
rotuil -r ... u · ore ~rea t l y . ' a:n.y of li o s , i rld p ndent s r es 
,ar dri v out of busi na:dilS . 
11. 
Subsequent l y much at;~l a tion aro a f or c aha n ator inves-
tig. ti on by t e :C'ed r 1 ~ :r. · de Co 1 ssiOlle i f te:r m"' y years of 
inve .t i gation, t b.a Co1 • i on recom a.nded i n 1934 an BJ ndment 
to the Cl yton Aot to re mbi~uou te a a~d pr vent · 
furthe r unorthodox o a in stor ~ tiviti a . 
~llus , t he obinAOn• :P.: .. t an ot a seed to oorreot the 
a -usi ve means of th ohai n stores. ~hi sa bill is o H~t!moa 
r ferred t o as '~h Anti ... Oht in s tore A.ot .. " 
I then tl"" s ouse t l e purpose of the ot a int nde y 1 ta 
Sl)Onaore , The provisions of the Act, oa;:-aai all:g Section 2 {a). 
wl1 ioh relates to quantity discounts er di cussed .. 
Chapter III1 titled 1 Adm1niatr a t1on of the Uobinson- Patman 
Aot" , ,oea int o d t a il concern in"! the · oti vi t1· .. nd r eEpon 1 ... 
b.iliti s of the F der · l l ra o Co 1 -sion t o ad 1n1stor and en-
foro t he Act. :1.:he Oommi es:t on is r1. ven nuthor.i ty to fix qua.nt1 ty 
limit i n suoh o sea here it damns it d ir- ble. 
The ooedure of the Fedora l r.rra. e Co miosi on to ;tnsti tute 
prooeedin e n t :r· rm i s tl or o ,hly i cusse • A eotion is 
also dev ote to t he axplsnat1 on of the :pe n 1 ties involve 1. 1 th 
f 111ure to 1 a th c .et e .. net de 1 t order of the Co 1 e:, 1 on. 
Ch .pt r IV, t i tl d n ·n t r Quant ty iscounts" is an 
e os i t ion of just rh t is t by ntity di counts . · ~e 
various t;) :p s oi' qu an · tJ i s cciunts .'lSi de from the str i .:.>ht 
u nti t y di.soot nt e.re d.i • cu· e • '2les conoi st of the Cut'lule.tive 
ii • 
oc Ot:t.nt ,.. .r e 
but ev i t t ions fr ·n the :lo .· or • .J.i · c 1 of t ho e !lo\te ant i n od 
typec3 r re di SCl SS01 separa tely Wi t h illustr -.ti Ch rt.=> t o 
0 i v ot rea .or a cl v.rer pr ent ~ .. t i on. 
In Ch :pt r V, entitle . 1 " Lendin.s ourt " .son 11 , I di s cuss 
t_..., .·torton Sal t Ca~:~e an ·t; roat Atlant ic J nd J: ci:fic 1ie o. 
In ·thE"; U:orton Sal t ,as e i ~ fEes ntod a thor ugh e :{~lanf tion o:r 
t Fetlara.l Trade Commis. ion. i 11vesti ation agG.in ... t thio oompany 
for discriminato:ry qu.a.nti t y discount o<'Ledulos. As is poi n t d 
ou · in t 1 i s chapter, .l.ha discotmt s che u l.es • ro t _eoretically 
available to all, bu-t :-a.. tmc t ionally they were ot . Only five 
customers could. benefit ·this discount schedule . Tbe jledera.l 
iT de omroissi on an t he Court~ foun this t o be indeed Price 
disc rimina t ion. T e Comp y hnd to abandon thi s disccnnt schedule. 
The · orton Se,lt Caae i s non th nornmti ve. case f or f uture 
qur-llt i 1;y di count ca9es . In i s c a s , the c cn t s t h orou h l y 
i roned o t v hat is me-ant ra a.rdinr- quant i ty discounts in the 
- .obinson- Pa.tme.n 1-ot . There 1 n longer f .• ny poss1 ble doubt as 
to what i s me ant r e ga.rdi n0 discriminator y quan.t ity di s crunt 
schedule • 
In regar s to t he Groat A & P Tea co., t he oh ie:f ob j ective 
i n t ho attac r \vas t he Atl antic Commission Co , • ro:ferre·d to a 
ACCO. hi s organizat ion since 1926• had ·c ted concurrently as 
purchasi ng a ent for A & P, sales gent :for v arious producers , 
buyi C7 broker f or competing r od uoers and genera l erchandi eing 
.1 obber i n t he Open m .ket . rnhiS .as found to be a Vi ola.ti on of 
iv . 
t he obin~ on-F .tmr Act s ine payments fro~ suppli r s to CCO 
s bro rage paym nts are ille~ 1 . 
ceo adopt ed pol.ioieo t o ci ~ cumvent th. a.t Act, but to r te.1n 
~or & the same ~ orrpot1tive ~dvsntu"a b increasi ~ A : P 1 e 
pr ofit s and at the s ame t i me limiti n~ the ~ of i t s of com_ titora. 
A & 1' a1 so ~as ohF.l. r ed vr.J. th obtai nin => bu fe · nee~ om 
manu :fa.ot :rer • suppliers • nd uo0rs. I ncl od in t hi s 't7a.S 
discriminatory quenti ~r d s oount • This was s honto be in vio• 
1 tion of t he Robinson- Pat an Act. rece1 ad these buying 
preferencea 1 by coercin.? the firms to yield to their demands, or 
els e A · l? · ould \li. thdraVJ t hei. r ... trona . e or en~ e i.n ma..llu:fact-
ur:tne on i ts OVi n a.ooount. 
Ch :pter VI i s t he concludlng ohavter in which I nupport my 
t hesis that quantity di s counts .~-er se ohould be llo ~edf ho .ever , 
when they tend to be used a.s a. means of disoriminati n , th n the 
anti- t r ust 1a·1a must be used to correct t hi s injustice,. 
Quantity di scounts are n inherent rt of our capi t alistic 
s stem. L r _,e buyer must b e ~blo to secure c qu,..nti.ty diso ount 
if he buys in auoh lt:Lr ,e quanti ties aa to render savi s in the 
c ost of delivery , manufac turing. or s •. le to the seller,. This is 
sound economic re sonin • The seller obtains deere sin~ coats in 
hie me,nu.faoturin proce.aa . The bnyer h.B.s t he a.dequ te oa it 1 
and outlet for his ::r;xroduo te .• he onl. a;y 1;o make t hi s trens ction 
rof i t able t o both J?arties . is b a. q .nti t · discount. I t is 
reciproca ted transaction .• ; he discount i s ssed on to the buyer 
from t Lo s eller. The selle r i a still a.ble to make .., :profit 
bee 'US' of t he ocono _ iE:H~ of 1 ..:r. o sc..:..l- pre ( t:r.ti n .• 
... 
• 
But, ~ fi:t.·m mru~t not uso i ts din :~unt sc 10d ' le a s 
"-he · oxto ~~ •. lt Co . di • to .:'t:.vor n en firtM to tho dis . v n-
te.ge of t _c others . A 
.1. ' iSCOUnt S C} e<. ·1 ~S mu.o t be oO 
t l1at n oo si l o :form of iscri 7 iLati on cr 1 e1:·1st • . A .. <ell af-
i n c sch,Jdule should bo sot u __ t o.t i s ,o · ts i c:;:-e-·.ses , · r -
c':\r.~.t t:.O'e - ·ti ce , proporti onull • ..... a t he a.ov..nt r cl1aoe i ncr uaes • 
... llu , we so- • quanti t.v i acount .. and. t• a anti .. tr· st l t:. •. s do 
bo r a di roct relationship to oaoh ot e • 
